

## Econ 113: February 10, 2015

- Fertility Decline, continued
  - David & Sundstrom: Old-Age Security Motive
  - Lahey: Effect of Abortion Laws on Fertility Control
- Immigration
  - Modeling Immigration
  - Historical Patterns
- Antebellum Labor Markets
- Antebellum Poor Relief in New York
- Antebellum Banking & Finance

## Model #2: "Old Age Security" Motive

- Paul David and Bill Sundstrom
- Goal: old-age security
- Result: fertility = f (labor market opportunities)
  - Parents bargain with children over care in old age.
  - So,  $\uparrow$  labor market opportunities
    - $\rightarrow \uparrow$  bargaining power of children
    - $\rightarrow \downarrow$  *likelihood child will care for elderly parent*
    - $\rightarrow \downarrow$  *expected return on parents' investment in children*
    - $\rightarrow \downarrow$  D(children)

## Coefficients in a log-log specification

- "log" means "ln"

Table 4. Determinants of Fertility, 1840

	Dependent Variable: Log of Child-Woman ratio in 1840		
	All States	North	South
Constant	4.7228** (0.6106)	4.0930** (1.3991)	4.7164** (0.3032)
Log (Male-Female ratio in rural areas, 1840)	0.5078 (0.2871)	0.3606 (0.6308)	0.6530** (0.1426)
Log (Rural land (lack of) availability index, 1840)	0.0269 (0.0484)	0.00783 (0.09151)	0.0461 (0.0321)
Log (ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural labor force, 1840)	-0.1799** (0.0243)	-0.1547** (0.0667)	-0.1547** (0.0153)
Log (ratio of wages paid non-farm labor to wages paid farm labor, 1850)	-0.8228** (0.2122)	-1.0416* (0.4907)	-0.8538** (0.1069)
n	29	16	13
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.776	0.661	0.951

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\* is significantly different from 0 at 1%

\* is significantly different from 0 at 5%

Source: David & Sundstrom, "Old-Age Security Motives," Table 4.



## Lahey: Regression Results

Table 5. Determinants of Fertility, 1850-1910

	Dependent Variable: Log of Child-Woman ratio				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Abortion law	0.121** (0.029)	0.149** (0.034)	0.118** (0.029)	0.124** (0.030)	0.148** (0.034)
Medical Exemption		-0.030 (0.025)			-0.028 (0.025)
Medical School			-0.033 (0.022)		
Birth Control Law				-0.012 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.019)
State & year fixed effects?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
State-specific time trends?	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
n	291	291	291	291	291

## Doing the Analysis


- State fixed effects
- Year fixed effects
- State-specific time trend

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## Immigration, 1820-2010



## Immigration

- What share of total population growth was due to immigration?

**Table 6. Share of Population Growth Attributable to Immigration**

1800-25	2-3 %
1830s	over 10 %
1840s	almost 25 %
1850s	almost 33 %

Source: Derived from *Historical Statistics*.

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## Who were the immigrants?

- **English**
  - throughout period
- **Irish**
  - 1846-55, following potato famine of 1845-47
  - poor, laborers
  - to eastern cities
- **German**
  - 1850s, following political upheaval and harvest failures
  - not poor, farmers
  - to midwest
- **Chinese**
  - 1850s, following political upheaval and famine
  - laborers, miners
  - to California

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## Shares of immigrants by home country

**Table 7. Patterns of Immigration by Home country**

	Great Britain	Ireland	Germany	China	Total #
1820s	20. %	40. %	4. %	0. %	128,500
1830s	14	32	23	0	538,400
1840s	15	46	27	0	1,427,300
1850s	16	37	35	1	2,814,600
1860s	26	20	35	3	2,081,300

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Series C89, C91, C92, C95, C104.

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## Shares of immigrants by occupation

**Table 8. Patterns of Immigration by Occupation**

	Skilled	Farmers	Laborers	Women & Kids
1820s	13. %	9. %	6. %	58. %
1830s	13	12	8	59
1840s	11	15	16	54
1850s	8	14	18	55
1860s	11	8	19	53

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, Series C120, C130, C133, C134, C136.

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
## *Modeling Migration*

- Question: What determines migration?
- Simplifications: One model with “push” & “pull” factors
  - Push factors
    - Why leave home
  - Pull factors
    - Why come to U.S.
- Assumptions:
  - Goal?
  - Behavioral assumptions?

## *Migration: Goal?*

## *Migration: Push & Pull factors?*

## *Migration: Behavioral Assumptions?*



### READ IN BOOK: Antebellum Labor

**Table 9 . Distribution of Labor Force**  
*Percent Distribution*

	Agri- culture	Manu- facturing	Trade & Service
1810	83.6	3.2	3.5
1840	63.1	8.8	11.2
1860	52.9	13.8	14.4

Source: Walton & Rockoff, Table 11-1.

**Ratio of female/male wages**

1820	30%
1850	50%
1890	55%

- Quickly, info that you should read in textbook
- Immigrants are disproportionately non-agricultural workers
- Organization of factory
  - Rhode Island System
  - Waltham System
- Very long hours
- Women workers
  - Be sure you can show with labor market graph why women (due to lower reservation wage) would thus be hired rather than men

### READ IN BOOK: Manufacturing Wages

**Table 10. Index of Antebellum Real Manufacturing Wages**

	1820	1832	1850	1860
<b>Total</b>	101	128-150	155-197	159-191
<i>Middle Atlantic:</i>				
Rural	90	118-139	131-166	166-199
Urban	111	150-176	165-209	154-185
Urban/Rural	1.2	1.1-1.5	1.0-1.6	0.8-1.1
<i>New England:</i>				
Rural	95	133-156	143-181	156-187
Urban	110	130-153	150-190	165-198
Urban / Rural	1.2	0.8-1.2	0.8-1.3	0.9-1.3

Source: Walton & Rockoff, Table 11-4. Urban/Rural ratio calculated.

### Modeling Labor Markets

## Wages, U.S. versus England

**Table 11. Relative Wages, US vs. England**  
For each group,  $W_{England}=100$

Worker	US wage, 1820-21 relative to English wage
<i>Skilled</i>	
carpenter	150
mason	147
ordinary machinist	114-129
best machinists	77-90
<i>Unskilled</i>	
common labor	135
farm labor	123-154
women in mills	102-153
boys 10-12 yrs old	115

Source: Walton & Rockoff, Table 11.5.

## Modeling rising skill premium

**Table 12. Skill Premium**

$$\frac{\text{daily wage of machinist}}{\text{daily wage of common labor in urban Massachusetts}} \times 100$$

1825	150
1831-40	156
1841-50	190
1851-60	220

Source: Walton & Rockoff, Table 11-6.

## Antebellum Poor Relief

- Joan Hannon, studied New York State, mid-1800s
- State and local governments; not federal
- “Indoor relief”
  - being placed in a poorhouse (or, almshouse)
- “Outdoor relief”
  - receiving money and living on own

**Table 13. Relieved Pauperism Rate, NY**

	% of Population
1823	1.1
1835	1.8
1849	3.5
1859	6.8

Source: Calculated from Hannon, “Poverty in the Antebellum Northeast,” *Journal of Economic History* 44 (December 1984): 1009.

## Who Were New York's Paupers?

**Table 14. Characteristics of Relief Recipients, 1843-59**

	1845-49	1855-59
Male	55.6	44.8
Native born	45.7	41.5
Disabled or Elderly	12.4	5.1
Able-bodied adults	40.6	72.2
Intemperate (alcoholics)	20.4	9.9
Debauched (immoral, probably related to prostitution)	1.6	0.6
Idle & Vagrant	2.9	4.6
Indigent & Destitute (poor)	15.7	57.0

Source: Hannon, “Poverty,” Table 1.


## Correlations (not multivariate regression)

Table 15. Factors correlated with N.Y. state pauperism rate (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. Checks to see if independent variable maps to >1 value of dependent variable.)

independent variable	1823		1840/44		1855/59	
	w/NYC	w/o NYC	w/NYC	w/o NYC	w/NYC	w/o NYC
population growth rate	-0.79*	-0.79*	0.23	0.68	0.60	0.43
% population that's urban	0.52	0.29	0.48	0.21	0.60	0.39
% Non-Agricultural L.F.	0.60	0.39	0.81**	0.71*	n.a.	n.a.
% Manufacturing L.F.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.48	0.21
Household production per capita	-0.69*	-0.54	-0.90**	-0.86*	-0.74*	-0.61
% population foreign born	0.27	0.00	0.79*	0.68	0.67*	0.50
Extent of tenancy (versus freeholders)	-0.07	-0.54	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

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## Impact of Erie Canal



MAP 10.1 Canal Impact Household manufacture of woolen cloth (an index of isolation from commercial routes) underwent a drastic change between 1820 and 1845 along the Erie Canal. The shaded areas indicate the one-third of the counties with the highest home production of woolen goods during this period. (Source: Arthur H. Cole, *American Wool Manufacture* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926], vol. 1.)

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## So, why rising antebellum poverty?

- Hannon concludes. . .
- Rising able-bodied rural poverty due to
  - Commercialization of agriculture and rise of factory system → decline of household production
- Rising able-bodied urban poverty due to
  - Industrialization created wage labor force facing seasonal, irregular work


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## Antebellum Banking and Finance

- Banks and Finance
  - How were funds channeled from savers to borrowers?
- Expansion of banking in antebellum period

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## What is a Bank?

- An institution that
  - accepts deposits
  - makes loans
  - earns profit
  - and holds reserves – a fraction of deposits – to cover withdrawals
- "State" banks
  - Chartered vs. free
  - "Free banking" era begins 1836
    - State by state basis


## How Many Banks?

**Table 1. Number of State Banks**

1811	88
1815	208
1816	246
1820	307
1830	330
1834	506
1840	901
1850	824
1860	1562

Source: *Historical Statistics* (1976), Series X561 (1811-1830) and Series X580 (1834-1860).

## Location of Banks



## Asymmetric Information

- **Adverse Selection**
  - Before initial transaction
  - Non-random selection of participants
- **Moral Hazard**
  - After initial transaction, during life of contract
  - Change in behavior due to contract
- How address asymmetric information?
  - government regulation
  - fines & penalties
  - monitoring

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## Industrial New England, 1820-60

- Naomi Lamoreaux
- Primary bank asset
  - Loans
- Primary source of bank funds
  - Today: deposits
  - Early 19<sup>th</sup> century: issuing stock
- Banks preferred stock
  - Risk / return tradeoff

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## Insider Lending

- (def): Kinship or other relationships between bank board members and bank loan customers
- Insider lending solves asymmetric information problems
  - Lending
  - Acquiring Bank Funds

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## Insider Lending: Effects

- Received wisdom: insider lending bad
- Lamoreaux: insider lending not bad in this context
  - Didn't lower credit availability
  - Didn't hurt soundness of banking system
  - Didn't decrease demand for bank stock
  - Didn't harm New England growth & development

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