MORE POWER TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ?

Abdul Noury , ECARES-ULB
and
Gérard Roland, UC Berkeley, ECARES, CEPR and WDI.

Today, the EU is no longer a mere union of states, but more and more a union of citizens. Nevertheless, European decisions are still taken almost exclusively by the states. The role of the elected European Parliament as a source of direct legitimation is underdeveloped. This role has to be further strengthened if we are to overcome the democratic deficit of the Union- through more decision-making powers for the European Parliament and the creation of a second chamber. [...]

Division of competences, more weight for the Parliament, making the treaties simpler- never since the early days of the European integration were there so many fundamental questions on the agenda and never were there so many momentous decisions to be made.¹

Joschka Fischer

1. Introduction

Proposals by German chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer to increase the power of the European Parliament relative to those of the European Commission and the European Council have been increasingly at the forefront of policy debates in Europe. Such proposals have triggered serious debates at the highest levels of European politics. The issue of increasing the powers of the European Parliament is likely to be at the heart of proposals for reform that are being discussed at the Convention that has been established at the December Laeken summit and at the 2004 intergovernmental conference to revise the Nice Treaty. What effects can one expect from increased powers to the European Parliament on decision-making in the EU? What does the past experience of voting behavior in the European Parliament teach us about how a Parliament with enhanced powers would behave?

When asking about how the European Parliament (EP) would “behave” if it had more powers, one has several questions in mind: 1) How are voting coalitions likely to be

¹ From the speech by Joschka Fischer in Dublin on 30 April 2001. The speech can be found at:

formed? What will be the role of “normal” left-right politics and coalitions based on cross-national ideological families and what will be the role of “country coalitions” where groups of countries coalesce on the basis of their national interests? 2) How stable and predictable will voting patterns be? In other words, what degree of discipline can one expect from coalitions forming in the Parliament?

Giving an answer to these questions is crucial in evaluating the effect of increased powers to the European Parliament. In particular, more power to the EP would have substantially different implications depending on whether legislators vote more along ideological party lines or according to coalitions of national interests. Indeed, if coalitions are cross-border and based mostly on the logic of the left-right divide, then giving more powers to the EP should reinforce integrationist tendencies in the EU and encourage European-wide political debates along the traditional left-right dimension. On the other hand, if coalitions are based mostly on national interests, then increasing the powers of the Parliament is likely to make decision-making in the EU less predictable and more chaotic. Indeed, coalitions will more likely resemble those that form in the European Council but the high number of European representatives and the higher diversity of interests involved is likely to make it more difficult to form majority coalitions. Increased powers to such a body is very likely to lead to paralyzing decision-making and make it less stable and predictable.

The answer to those questions is even more important in the light of the future enlargement of the EU to countries from Central Europe. If the EP votes mostly along ideological party lines, enlargement will mainly increase the size of the EP and possibly affect its ideological composition but it would not fundamentally threaten its ability to operate. Giving more power to the EP would then be beneficial for decision-making within the EU because it would mitigate the dangers of paralysis in decision-making that are inherent to enlargement, especially in the light of the Nice Treaty (see e.g. Baldwin et al., 2001). On the other hand, if the Euro-deputies vote mainly on the basis of national

interests, more power to the EP is likely to further contribute to the paralysis of decision-making in the EU Council.

The literature studying institutions of the EU and is rapidly growing and the number of contributions devoted to the EP is becoming large (Hix, 2001; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Raunio 1997). The existing academic research on the EP does not provide straightforward answers to such important questions mainly due to the lack of the data. In particular, the impact of increased power to the Parliament or of enlargement has not yet been analyzed.

We are in a position to give a better answer to questions about the EP than the existing literature. We have put together a unique database including all roll call votes, i.e. legislators' recorded votes, from all individual deputies between 1989 and 1999. Thus, our database covers in the complete Third and Fourth parliaments, with respectively 2733 and 3740 roll call votes registered for the former and the latter.² Such a database allows the most complete analysis to date of voting behavior.

The usefulness of such a database goes well beyond the purpose of the paper at hand. Very little is known in the large public about the EU Parliament. Yet, the information made available to the public about roll calls allows to scrutinize very carefully the behavior of Euro-deputies, much more so than for most national Parliaments in Europe where such information is less readily available. This information will become more and more valuable over time and will allow to understand the dynamic evolution of voting behavior in the European Parliament in its early years.

Turning back to the objectives of our paper, the analysis of the dynamics of voting behavior in the EP is clearly useful to assess the effect of increased power to the EP and of enlargement. The power and responsibility of the European Parliament has steadily

² This is part of a larger research project jointly organized with Simon Hix of the London School of Economics putting together a database on voting in the European Parliament from 1979 to 2001.

increased over time. Before 1987 the EP had only a “consultation” power. The Single European Act of 1987 increased the power of the EP by introducing the “cooperation” procedure. The 1990 Maastricht Treaty granted further powers to the EP by initiating the “co-decision” procedure. Finally the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty has strongly extended the co-decision procedure. Under this procedure, which requires the agreement of both the Council and the EP on legislation, the EP has essentially the right to amend and veto legislation over many policy areas such as internal market, social policy, consumer protection and the environment. This increase in power has not only changed the status of the European Parliament as an actor within the European Union but has also had an effect on the voting and participation behavior of its membership. Moreover, under the Fourth parliament, the EP was enlarged to representatives from the new entrants Austria, Sweden and Finland. We can thus evaluate the effect of that enlargement on voting behavior in the EP.

The empirical analysis of roll call votes in the EP suggests clear answers to the questions we ask:

- Yes, giving more power to the EP should reinforce an already very visible tendency toward traditional left-right politics typical of national legislatures;
- Yes, giving more power to the EP in the context of enlargement can enhance the functioning of EU institutions and mitigate paralysis in decision-making that risks to plague the EU Council after enlargement.

These are important policy implications in the enlargement context. The Nice Treaty made all the important institutional decisions relative to enlargement, not only by setting the weights of the 12 potential new entrants in the European Council (and also in the Parliament and in the Commission) but also by deciding on the majority rules in the Council. Baldwin et al. (2001) showed that with enlargement to 27 EU countries, the passage probability³ of a decision in the Council would go from 7.8% under the current rules with 15 EU countries to 2.1% under the Nice rules, a clear deterioration. The Nice

³ The passage probability is the share of winning coalitions among all possible coalitions of countries in the EU Council. It is an abstract indication of the difficulty of passing a bill.

Treaty has thus failed to address satisfactorily the issue of possible paralysis of decision-making within an enlarged EU. The results of our analysis suggest that such a paralysis of decision-making is not likely to happen in the EP. Moreover, debates and coalitions in the EP will take place along the traditional left-right dimension. Even if no change is made in the voting rules in the Council after enlargement, we think that giving more power to the EP should improve decision-making in the EU under the Nice rules. There are two reasons for this. First, more power to the EP should increase cohesion of party groups as our research suggests and thus generate rather predictable voting patterns in the EP. This would also increase the legitimacy of the EP. Second, an increased legitimacy of the EP is likely to create pressure on the Council. Country representatives in the Council would tend to use their veto right more sparsely if they feel the pressure of the EP, especially in cases where their veto rights would be used to defend special minority interest groups at home. A more powerful EP having at heart pan-European interests (along the left-right dimension) would doubtlessly help reveal such veto practices to the general public, thereby leading Council members to refrain more from using their veto rights to defend special interests which conflict with the more general interest of the public.

Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the role of the EP in the EU decision-making process as a whole and discusses why the issues of cohesion and coalition formation in the EP are relevant in EU-decision-making in the enlargement context. Section 3 examines whether Euro-deputies vote primarily according to their ideology or to national interest. To do that we measure the cohesion of party and country vote and analyze coalition formation for both party groups and national delegations. Then we focus on Euro-deputies' voting behavior in a multi-dimensional policy space. In Section 4 we use regression analysis to examine the effects of enlargement and increased power on voting discipline. The behavior of new entrants and the Members from the poorer countries are analyzed respectively in section 5 and finally Section 6 concludes.

2. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WITHIN THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF ENLARGEMENT.

Since the Foundation of the European Community, the two main decision-making bodies have been the European Commission and the European Council. The success of European integration owes a lot to the *Méthode Communautaire* devised by the Founding fathers of the EU. The *Méthode Communautaire* is a decision-making method where the European Commission has more or less exclusive rights to draft legislative proposals. The Commission plays thus the role of “advocate” of European integration while the European Council, representing the heads of governments of EU countries, plays the role of a veto chamber, regrouping national interests. The agenda-setting role of the Council has remained limited. Whereas it can reject proposals by the Commission, a unanimity in the Council is needed to *amend* a Commission proposal. The success of the *Méthode Communautaire* relies on the fact that the Commission has constantly proposed new legislation for European integration, thus preventing a collective action problem at the level of initiation of legislative proposals, whereas the Council, which based its decisions mostly on unanimity rule in the first decades of European integration, represented sovereign national interests.

Until 1979, the European Parliament was essentially composed of delegations from national Parliaments consulted on a narrow range of legislative proposals. Since 1979, the EP is elected by universal suffrage and is the only major EU political body directly elected by European citizens. Its powers within the EU were initially virtually nil as it played the role of a consultative body. Its powers have nevertheless gradually expanded over the years. The Single European Act introduced the *cooperation* and the *Assent* procedure. The Cooperation procedure applied to roughly one third of the legislation brought to the EP, and in particular the bulk of legislative harmonization related to the Single Market program. The Assent procedure applies to the admission of new members, to association agreements with Third countries and a few other tasks like modifications of the procedure of European elections, modification of the protocol of the ECB, sanctions against serious breach of the Treaty by a member state. Here, a Council position must be approved by a majority (majority of Members for accession and

electoral reform, otherwise simple majority). The cooperation procedure is composed of two readings where the first one is like the consultation procedure. At the Second reading, the Council's decision in the first reading is sent to the EP who has 3 months to either approve, reject or amend. Rejection requires a majority of EP members. The EP's position is then sent back to the Commission and to the Council. The Commission can either withdraw the proposal, accept or reject the EP's amendments. Amendments by the EP accepted by the Commission require unanimity to be rejected by the Council. Unanimity is also required to reject the Commission's proposal. Amendments rejected by the Commission can be adopted by the Council again by unanimity. While the increase in power entailed by the cooperation procedure was not huge, it was nevertheless significant. Decisions that go through a second reading are usually decisions the Council wants to pass. The EP may thus use the threat of imposing, in the Second reading, a unanimity requirement that may not pass in the Council. It may also threaten the Commission with rejection if it does not adopt its amendments. Thus, in case of votes with qualified majority, the EP has some clout under the cooperation procedure.

INSERT FIGURE 1

The Co-decision procedure, established in the Maastricht Treaty and improved in the Amsterdam Treaty gives more power than before to the EP. First, it allows rejection of legislation by the EP at the second reading. Second, if the Council does not agree with an amended proposal by the EP at the second reading, the proposal goes to a conciliation committee composed of an equal number of members on each side responsible for carving out a compromise. If a compromise fails, the proposal is rejected. Otherwise, it is adopted provided it is accepted by the EP (simple majority) and by the Council (Qualified majority). The co-decision procedure thus gives effective bargaining power to the EP as it can use its right of rejection to negotiate compromises with the Council. Note that the role of the Commission has been weakened under the co-decision procedure as it is not important any more for the EP to secure support of the Commission for its amendments. Co-decision now covers a great deal of EU legislation with the important exceptions of EMU, agriculture, fisheries and fiscal harmonization. Moreover, in some co-decision areas (citizenship, mobility of workers, self-employed, culture), unanimity is still required in the Council which makes bargaining with the EP particularly difficult.

INSERT FIGURE 2

Decisions in the EP are usually taken by Simple Majority but a majority of members is required for rejection under cooperation and co-decision. Votes are of 3 types: by show of hand (rare), electronic vote or roll call vote. A roll call vote can be requested if at least 32 MEPs or a political Group ask for it. MEPs do not know in advance whether a roll call will be requested or not. Roughly a third of all votes are by roll-call but their share has been increasing over time. In 1988, the number of roll-call votes per hour of plenary session was about 1.1. In 1998, it was about 1.5.

In our database, 2291 out of 6473 votes were directly legislative and used one of the existing procedures. Among the legislative votes, 46% used the consultation procedure, 27% the cooperation procedure, 25% the co-decision procedure and 1% the assent procedure.

MEPs are organized in political groups. The seatings in the hemicycle are like in national Parliaments with parties ranked from left to right according to their ideology. In the current Parliament, the seating is as follows. At the extreme left, one has the radical left which regroups many of the communist, former communist or extreme left parties plus the Nordic Green Left parties from Scandinavia. Then, from left to right there is the Party of the European Socialists (PES), the Greens and allies regrouping regional parties mostly from Spain, but also from Wales, the liberal ELDR (European Liberal Democrat and Reformists), the European People's Party (mostly Christian Democratic and conservative parties)(EPP-ED), Eurosceptic gaullist and rightist groups and non affiliated. The names of the groups change over time across legislatures and sometimes within legislatures reflecting defections from some national parties. Table 1 gives the party groups with the denominations they had over time. In subsequent tables, we will use the common abbreviation listed in the second column to the left of Table 1.

INSERT TABLE 1.

It is not by coincidence that MEPs are ranked according to ideology. The party groups to which they belong have a real existence and internal organization. The EP allocates budgets to party groups. Each group has a Chair, a secretariat and staff working

for them. Members of Groups meet in Brussels and during plenary sessions in Strasbourg to make joint voting decisions. Groups have “whips” who check the attendance and voting behavior of group members even though groups have limited means to sanction their members. Such structures do not exist at all for the national delegations in the EP.

The question of whether voting in the EP happens along ideological or country lines is very important in terms of understanding both the role of the EP within the European institutions and also in terms of thinking about the impact of enlargement.

If coalition formation in the EP were to happen along country lines, then the EP would be irrelevant for political decision-making within the EU. Indeed, the majority rules in the Council (qualified majority or unanimity) are more stringent than those in the European Parliament. If coalition formation in the EP would take place on the basis of country interests, like in the Council, then votes in the EP would never represent a constraint in decision-making in the EU. A measure that can be accepted by the Council would always be accepted by the EP and a measure that would get a majority in the EP would not necessarily pass the hurdle of the Council (see e.g. Bindseil and Hantke, 1997; Turnovec, 1996). In a Europe of 27 countries, if EP coalitions are based on country groups, coalition formation in the EP would become very unpredictable and possibly chaotic but the same combinatorics of possible coalitions should also apply to the Council, and even more so given the higher majority threshold in the Council. However, if coalition formation in the EP occurs along the traditional left-right dimension, even after enlargement, then decision-making (in terms of danger of paralysis in decision-making) in the EP should not suffer from enlargement whereas decision-making in the Council will, at least under the Nice rules. This should have a positive effect on the legitimacy of the EP. A well-functioning EP may exercise substantial pressure on the Council to adopt certain decisions supported by a majority of MEPs, and possibly enjoying support in the population. If on top of that, the EP is given more power (extension of co-decision, possibly more powers in the nomination of the Commission), then this should have a stabilizing influence on EU institutions after enlargement and mitigate the dangers of paralysis in decision-making.

An important normative question is however the following: how important is it to prevent paralysis in decision-making? Indeed, much of the literature on European

integration takes the point of view that too stringent majority rules are negative (see also the analysis in Baldwin et al., 2001). From the point of view of economic theory, unanimity rule has mostly virtues. Even before Buchanan and Tullock (1969), economists understood that unanimity rule ensures pareto-improving decisions, i.e. decisions where no interest is hurt compared to the status quo. This insight would seem at best partial for observers of the EU decision-making process. Aghion and Bolton (1997) have made an important step in improving our understanding of the trade-offs involved under various majority rules and their analysis applies very well to the European decision-making process. The starting point of their analysis is that constitutions are incomplete contracts. They cannot foresee ex ante all possible contingencies. Relaxing the constraint of unanimity voting has the important effect of reducing the *holdup* power of vested interests who stand to lose from efficient decisions adapted to changes in the state of the world, especially when compensation of those groups entails substantial inefficiencies. On the other hand, by relaxing the unanimity constraint, one increases the likelihood of tyranny of the majority hurting minority interests. In the context of the EU, it is very difficult to tell what the optimal supermajority should be. Most observers would probably say that majority rule in the Council gives too much holdup power to individual countries whereas we cannot really think of clearcut examples of tyranny of the majority in the EU context. In any case, whatever reforms will be decided in relation to majority hurdles in the Council, a more powerful EP in an enlarged Europe would likely to function reasonably well *provided* coalitions occur on a left-right dimensions and *provided* voting behavior is more or less predictable due to a well-functioning European party system. We now turn to the evidence.

3. PARTY OR COUNTRY LOYALTY?

Since it is very important to determine whether Euro-deputies vote more according to their ideological loyalty (i.e. with their party group) or according to national interests (i.e. with other Euro-deputies from the same country, we used different measure party and country loyalty from different angles.

2.1 The cohesion index

The main measure we use is the cohesion index CI_i for a given group i of voters. We used this measure in order to compare the cohesion of voting within a party group versus within a country group. Note by Y_i the number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given vote, N_i the number of No votes and A_i the number of abstentions. The cohesion index is defined as follows:

$$CI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - [(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)} \quad (1)$$

Thus, for example if deputies of a Party (country) cast 100 ballots on a given vote and if all vote Yes, then the cohesion index will be equal to 1. However, if they are completely divided and 50 vote Yes and 50 vote No, then the cohesion index will be equal to 0.⁴ The cohesion index is a variant of what is usually called the Rice Agreement index following Rice (1928). Tables 2 and 3 give the mean cohesion index of parties and countries and their standard deviations (in parentheses) respectively for the third and for the fourth parliament.

INSERT TABLE 2 and TABLE 3.

We clearly see that cohesion is much stronger for parties than for countries. The cohesion index for parties has an average of 84.2% in the third parliament and of 82.2% in the fourth parliament while the average for countries is respectively 74.4 and 68.8%. There is thus a 10% point difference in cohesion. Moreover, the standard deviation is also lower for parties than for countries showing that the variability in cohesion is much lower for parties than for countries. The cohesion of countries remains generally somewhat higher than that for the EP as a whole (58% in the third parliament and 52% in the fourth parliament). This reflects to a certain extent the fact that many national delegations are

⁴ The cohesion index varies between 0 and 1 in almost all cases. Not however that if there are many of abstention votes, the index may be negative. Indeed, in a few cases we have negative indexes for two parties (PES and Anti-Europeans): 19 out of 6747 cases for socialists and 250 out of 6474 for anti-Europeans .

dominated by one party.⁵ Similarly, the large cohesion for Greece and Luxembourg can be explained by the fact they are mainly affiliated to the two largest political groups. Note however that the cohesion index for France is lower than that for the EP! French representatives are thus the most divided country in the EP, a fact that maybe runs counter to the intuition of many. Note also that cohesion is the highest among the party families reflecting the usual political cleavages in advanced democracies: socialists (PES), christian-democrats and conservatives (EPP), greens (GR) and liberals (ELDR). Note however that the Greens and the Radical Alliance (RAD) have the highest cohesion in the Fourth parliament.

These cohesion indices may not give an adequate reflection of overall cohesion because of the relatively large share of unanimity or near unanimity votes. Many votes in the EP reflect the position of the Parliament relative to Commission proposals or Council decisions or even Parliament initiatives. These votes pass often by unanimity or near unanimity. Indeed, despite representing different ideologies and countries, MEPs generally share the objective of increasing the power of the EP. There is thus a concerted effort in the EP, whenever possible, to appear united in front of the Council and the Commission, especially in case of a conflict between these three bodies. Figure 3 gives the distribution of the majority sizes of the EP for the third and fourth parliament. The distribution is bimodal with a local mode around .5 in the third parliament but a high concentration towards 1. In the fourth parliament, there is a high mode of 0.85 and much more weight at lower majority sizes showing less consensus, and suggesting a move towards more classical legislative dynamics.

INSERT FIGURE 3

In order to mitigate the effect of these unanimity votes on our average cohesion index, we calculated a “weighted” cohesion index where the cohesion index is divided by the observed majority in the European Parliament multiplied by two. Thus a vote with a

⁵ The first past the post electoral rule sent mostly U.K. Labor party representatives to the EP.

narrow majority of 50% gets a weight of one and a unanimity vote gets a weight of $\frac{1}{2}$. When computing the average of those weighted cohesion indexes, we divide them by the average index a perfectly cohesive party would obtain so that a perfectly cohesive group would still get an average of 100%.

INSERT TABLE 4 AND 5

As one can see from Tables 4 and 5, the changes with respect to Tables 1 and 2 are not very big. Two things are worth noting however. First of all, the difference between cohesion of parties and of countries is now more pronounced. The cohesion of countries is clearly lower whereas the cohesion of parties remains basically unchanged. Moreover, in contrast to Tables 2 and 3, the cohesion of parties tends to be stronger in the fourth parliament as compared with the third whereas for countries, the opposite can be observed. The lower cohesion for countries shows that the latter picks up the effect of unanimity or near unanimity votes whereas the cohesion of parties remains strong even when placing more weight on votes with narrower majorities.

Still another way of looking at the same problem is to look at cohesion for divided votes in the EP, that is votes where the effective majority was not close to 100%. Tables 6 and 7 show the cohesion indexes for the votes when only votes with majority lower than a certain threshold. We lowered the threshold gradually from 100% to 65%.

INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7

Here the results are even more striking. We see that the cohesion of parties remains roughly the same and hardly falls. The Greens in the Fourth Parliament are even more cohesive for divided votes! whereas the cohesion of countries falls sharply, especially in the Fourth Parliament, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the cohesion of countries moves with the cohesion of the EP. Interestingly, in the Fourth Parliament, the U.K. and Ireland remain more cohesive than other countries when we throw away votes with high majority. Germany has the lowest cohesion for votes with less than 65% majority both in the Third and in the Fourth Parliament.

One immediately wonders whether the cohesion of parties is the same across issues. We thus divided the votes in 11 large categories of issues using the title of the vote as reported in the Minutes of the plenary sessions. To give an example, the proposals on November 17, 1998 include ‘Employment in Europe’, ‘Social action programme 1998 - 2000’, ‘Clinical trials’, and ‘Combating fraud /Protection of Euro’ among many other issues. We made use of these subject titles to classify roll-call votes in 11 large categories together with one category that contains 378 votes difficult to classify. Each large category was in turn divided in subclasses. A difficulty here is that a large number of votes can be classified in many different ways. For instance the last vote on ‘Combating Fraud’ can be classified in ‘Legal’ or in other categories such as ‘Security’. Another difficulty relies in the fact that many different issues and conflicts may be hidden under a same heading. As we will see below, even a particular voting sequence on one resolution or bill, entails many different issues and corresponding voting coalitions. With a very large number of votes, much of the noisiness related to vote-specific idiosyncracies is filtered away. This is less the case with disaggregation into smaller number of votes, even under one homogeneous heading. Table 8 lists these issues as well as the number of votes covered in each category. Tables 9a and 9b give us the cohesion per broad issue in the Third and Fourth Parliament.

INSERT TABLE 8 and 9a,b.

Tables 8a and 8b show that there is no striking difference in cohesion when dividing votes according to issues. The table for the third Parliament nonetheless tends to indicate that while socialists become more cohesive on “Human Beings” issues (human rights, refugees,...) , conservatives (EPP) and liberals (ELDR) are cohesive on Security issues and greens and leftists are cohesive on nature and environmental issues. The table also indicates that radicals (RAD) and Gaullists (GAUL) vote cohesively on issues related to Services. For the fourth Parliament, the above findings remain true for conservatives, greens and radicals but not for socialists and liberals who become now also more cohesive on Services. Note that the mean cohesion index is the lowest for Drugs and the Legal System in the Third and Fourth Parliament whereas it is the highest for Services and Security, again in both Parliaments.

It is useful to compare the evidence produced in this section to that of a national Parliament where both ideology and regional identity play a role. Belgium fits that definition pretty well. Among national parliaments the Belgian parliament is the most comparable parliament because on the one hand there are two communities or ‘nations’ and several political families. There are distinct regional Flemish and French-speaking Socialist, Christian Democratic, liberal and Green Parties and there is no single national party. The “socialist family” is thus composed of two distinct regional socialist parties. Party families in Belgium are thus conceptually close to party groups in the EP. Like party groups in the EP, these political families also include different tendencies going from left to right and including regionalists. Of course, the Belgian parliament is much smaller than the EP. Moreover, unlike, the European Union, Belgium has a genuine parliamentary system. Cohesion of party families should reflect cohesion of government coalitions since coalitions are based on party families, never on parties only.⁶ According to recent theories of political regimes, parties forming a coalition in parliamentary regimes are predicted to be very cohesive (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998, Persson et al. 2000).

INSERT TABLE 10.

Given the relevance of the comparison with Belgium, we were able to collect more than 2000 roll call votes from the Belgian parliament during the 49th legislature (i.e. from 30/06/1995 to 18/12/1997).⁷ Our summary results are listed in Table 10. We can immediately see from Table 10 that party cohesion is much stronger among Belgian party families, confirming the prediction about cohesion of coalition partners in parliamentary systems. Except for the Liberals, all other party families have a cohesion index ranging from 95% to more than 98%. The average cohesion index is 93%. The cohesion index for

⁶ Thus for example, if the Flemish Greens are in the coalition, the French-speaking Greens must also be part of it even though they could be dispensed with to form a minimum-winning coalition, which is the case today. Cohesion of families consists mainly of that commitment to participate together in a coalition or otherwise to be in the opposition.

⁷ Surprisingly, it is very difficult if not impossible to collect roll call votes for national Parliaments like Germany or France. Such data are more readily available in newer democracies such as Poland and the Czech republic. See e.g. Noury et al. (1999) and Mielcova and Noury (1998).

Liberals is only 73%, i.e. 20 percentage points lower than the average cohesion index. Note that the Liberals were then in the opposition and that the coalition was composed of the socialist and Christian democratic families. The very strong party cohesion stands in stark contrast to the cohesion on a regional or linguistic basis which is very low. The average cohesion index for regions is one third of that found for political families. Note also that the cohesion for the parliament as a whole is higher than the cohesion of Flemish MPs. Note however the lower cohesion of the Parliament compared to the EP.

INSERT TABLE 11

It is also interesting to compare the Belgian Parliament and the EP on some key stylized facts. Table 11 shows the average ‘yes’, ‘no’, abstention and presence rates in both Parliaments. The most striking difference is the generally high absentee rate in the EP. Note also that the average percentage of ‘no’ votes is higher in the Belgian Parliament than in the EP. Looking a bit further, we compared the percentage of proposals put to vote that were accepted and rejected. We found an acceptance rate of 40% in the Belgian Parliament compared to 58.7% in the EP. This fact is surprising because it contradicts the view one can easily derive from game-theoretic models that only votes that are likely to pass are put forward. This is not true in the EP, but even less true in Belgium which is a full-fledged Parliamentary system!

INSERT TABLE 12

We also compared cohesion in the EP with cohesion in the US Congress. Table 12 gives the cohesion and relative cohesion index for US Congress between 1991 and 2000. At first sight the cohesion among democrats and republicans in Congress appears lower than that of Party groups in the EP. Indeed cohesion is usually in the 70% while it is in the 80% and higher for EP groups, and above 85% for the two main parties, the PES and EPP. However, votes are also much more polarized in the US Congress. If one looks at the relative cohesion indexes (i.e. cohesion of parties relative to the cohesion of the legislature), then one finds that cohesion of parties in the US Congress is somewhat higher, on average above 1.7, whereas PES and EP have respectively a relative cohesion of 1.43 and 1.4 for the third Parliament and of 1.57 and 1.56 for the fourth Parliament. Moreover, cohesion has been increasing in the EP whereas in the US Congress, it has been declining since 1996 and reached levels comparable to those of PES and EPP for the

fourth Parliament. Cohesion in the EP and in the US Congress are thus quite comparable. The comparison with the US is especially relevant because the US is a presidential system. The theories of democratic political regimes cited above predict that elected representatives in a presidential system vote less cohesively than in a parliamentary system. Since the EU is not a parliamentary system (but not a presidential system either), its cohesion is not predicted to be as high as in parliamentary systems. However, it is overall reassuring to see that party cohesion is quite comparable to that observed in the House of the most mature presidential system in the world.

Overall, the evidence from the EP shows us that cohesion among parties is relatively strong and is getting stronger over time while cohesion among countries is not strong and is getting weaker as the size of majorities in the EP tend to decrease. This indicates that party groups tend to act cohesively like in normal democratic legislatures. This also suggests that coalitions among parties should form according to ideological affinity. We now turn to that question.

3.2. Coalitions

Given that the EU is not a parliamentary system, there is no coalition government. We should therefore not expect the typical pattern of legislative voting of parliamentary systems where parties of the coalition vote together and parties of the opposition likewise. Coalitions are likely to form on a vote by vote basis. Nevertheless, to the extent that parties are cohesive as seen above, it is interesting to see which parties tend to vote together more often or less often. Is there in particular a left-right pattern in coalition formation across votes? If this is the case, then voting of left wing parties should be positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with right wing parties. To do this, we measured for each vote the intensity of support within a party group for a majority decision, i.e. the percentage of members who voted in favor of (against) the decision when it was adopted (refused) and when a majority of the group voted in favor (against). We call this the intensity of support. In Table 13, we present the correlation coefficients of the intensity of support for bills across parties.

INSERT TABLE 13.

We clearly see a positive correlation between left-wing parties, a positive correlation between right wing parties and no correlation or negative ones across the ideological spectrum. In the third parliament, votes of PES are mostly correlated with those of the LEFT and RAD and so are the votes of GR. Votes of EPP are mostly correlated with those of ELDR and two other right-wing political groups, GAUL and ANTI-EU. One thus has the broad left (socialists, Greens, Left and Radicals) on one side and the broad right on the other (conservatives, Gaullists, liberals and nationalists). Note however the very centrist role of the liberals whose votes are correlated to those of socialists but not to the other more left-wing parties. A similar picture emerges in the fourth parliament, except that now the votes of PES are more strongly correlated with the votes of GR and less with the LEFT. This reflects recent tendencies of socialist parties to move from labor parties to “rainbow-style” parties. Note also that correlations are not “transitive”. Thus, PES votes are more correlated with those of GR and the latter more with those of LEFT. However, votes of PES are not more but less correlated with those of LEFT. This suggests that coalition formation is not unidimensional, a point we pick up below when analyzing the dimensionality of coalition formation. Votes of EPP are now also more strongly correlated with GAUL and less with ELDR. The centrist position of the latter is confirmed. Note also that votes of GR are more correlated with those of LEFT, confirming tendencies towards rainbow coalitions on the left.

For comparison, Tables 14a and 14b looking at country correlation do not show any specific pattern tending to suggest stable groups of coalitions. No negative correlation can be observed nor is there stronger correlation between specific groups of countries. The correlations pick up mostly the changes in the distribution of the size of the majority. Note that our measure of coalition formation (the correlation coefficients) are based on all votes. As already mentioned, for a large number of the EP votes the observed majority is large. When selecting the votes with narrower majorities (e.g. for votes with majority less or equal to 70%) the results of table 13 are reinforced.

INSERT TABLE 14

Another way of looking at coalitions is to ask what are the most frequent majority coalitions that emerge. By majority coalition, we mean a situation where a majority of members of a party or a country voted in favor of a decision and it was adopted or against it and it was refused. The most frequent coalition, not surprisingly given the high number of unanimity votes, was the coalition of all parties or countries. Nevertheless, a striking difference can be observed in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 looks at the frequency of the number of parties in the majority. We see that in the third parliament, the mode is 7 while in the fourth parliament it is 6. While this number includes all observed coalitions of 6 parties, the figure nevertheless suggests some tendency toward party polarization in the fourth parliament. Figure 4 stands in contrast with Figure 5 where one sees that the most frequent coalition of countries is the one that includes all countries. The difference between Figures 4 and 5 once more clearly suggests that the dividing line in Parliament is ideology and not country interests.

INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5

3.3. Examples of votes.

The statistical analysis gives a comprehensive picture that is more accurate than the inferences one may draw from looking at specific votes. It is nevertheless useful to complement the statistical analysis by specific examples to get a feel of coalition formation and cohesion with particular votes or voting sequences.

We first start with some of the most dramatic votes in the EP that were given wide publicity in the European media, i.e. attempts to bring down the Commission by a vote of censure. The EP has always had the right to censure the Commission but it is only in recent years, under the Santer commission that it has tried to use that right.

The first attempt at bringing the Commission down was in relation with the BSE or mad cow disease in February 1997. After voting in August 1996 a resolution very critical of the Commission's attitude towards the BSE crisis, the EP reconvened in

February to discuss the results of the official inquiry of the Commission's handling of the BSE crisis. A resolution was tabled supported by PES, EPP, ELDR, GR and GAUL. The resolution instructs the Commission to follow up seriously the conclusions of the Committee by November and threatens otherwise with a vote of censure after that. The resolution was adopted by near unanimity (422 for, 49 against and 48 abstentions). The vote of the motion had been put on the agenda before the vote of censure proposed by Belgian socialist Happart. The vote of censure nevertheless attracted a surprising 117 votes in favor, 326 votes against and 15 abstentions. This was nevertheless a very split vote without a majority in any group or country coming up in favor. Nevertheless, there was a substantial support for the motion, with ELDR and LEFT voting more or less one to one in favor while PES, EPP and GR voted more or less one to three in favor. Note that 15 out of 47 U.K. representatives voted in favor. Only the deputies from Luxemburg voted against by solidarity with Santer.

Things became much more serious in January 1999 with the Cresson-Marin crisis, following the reports of mismanagement and diversion of funds in the offices of these two socialist Commissioners. The occasion was the refusal of discharge of the 1996 budget by the Parliament because of those scandals. Two resolutions were on the table, one put forward by EPP (Martens), ELDR (Cox) and GR (Aelvoet), the other one was put forward by the socialists, the left and the radicals. The former explicitly asked for the resignation of Cresson and Marin, the latter called for a committee of experts to examine questions of fraud and calls for changes in the administrative culture of the Commission and other measures. The first vote taken was on a request of GR to vote on the motion of censure before voting on the various resolutions. The Greens (Telkämper) argued that the vote was the most important one and that votes on the resolutions first would divide the EP. The socialists (Green) spoke against by invoking past procedural experience, as in the BSE motion of censure. The motion was rejected by 429 votes against 99 and 14 abstentions. The Greens voted *en bloc* in favor, the non affiliated and anti-Europeans voted with big majority in favor and LEFT voted the motion with a narrow majority. It was rejected by a large majority of members of other parties. By contrast, one sees that there is no clear pattern in the country votes. A majority of all country groups rejected the motion, following roughly the pattern of the EP as a whole.

INSERT TABLE 15

The first resolution (asking explicitly for the resignation) was then put to vote paragraph by paragraph and was rejected in 10 votes. The pattern of those votes (available from the authors) was quite clear. The ELDR, GR and EPP voted in favor with support from others except for PES and RAD who were able to block the votes by a narrow majority. In some votes LEFT sided with PES. The country pattern of votes is less clear but nevertheless somewhat indicative. A narrow majority of deputies in all countries voted in favor but a majority of MEPs from the UK, Italy, Greece, Spain and Luxemburg voted against. This probably mostly reflected the party composition of votes except for Spain and Luxemburg where solidarity with Marin and Santer played a role. There was no French solidarity vote with Cresson. The Italian and Greek votes may indicate a different political culture where the criticisms to Cresson and Marin seemed benign and more part of the day-to-day “realistic” administrative culture in those countries.

The second resolution was then put to vote in three steps. Here the party composition of the vote was substantially different. A majority coalition voted in favor with the PES, LEFT, RAD and GAUL. The EPP was split and so were the liberals. Here again, the country composition reflects mostly the party composition but also with a Mediterranean support and a Nordic opposition. The results can be seen in table 16.

INSERT TABLE 16

After the adoption of this resolution and an intervention by Santer, the vote on the motion of censure then took place. Leaders of party groups expressed the position of their group. Martens, representing EPP said that EPP deputies should vote with their conscience, de facto not imposing any discipline. Cox for ELDR, Aelvoet for GR, Bonde for ANTI-EU unambiguously called for censure. Patsy for GAUL announced a split vote from his group with the French supporting censure and the Italian, Irish and Portuguese against. Puerta for the LEFT announced that a majority of their group would vote the censure. Lalumière for RAD announced they would vote against. The votes followed exactly the announcements of the group leaders but cohesion was less than perfect in the

case of the liberals. The motion was voted down with a narrow majority. The results of the vote can be seen in table 17.

INSERT TABLE 17

All in all, we see with one of the most dramatic voting sessions in the history of the EP that party group politics played the dominant role. Nevertheless, party discipline was clearly lower than is the case in normal parliamentary politics. One should emphasize that this dramatic example is not one where the traditional left-right dimension is expected to emerge. Thus, the Greens and the Liberals are generally very strongly supportive of transparency and clean government, which is much less the case for the socialists. Country interests nevertheless did not play a substantial role except probably for the MEPs from Luxemburg and to a smaller extent the MEPs from Spain and Italy. MEPs from Italy voted with large majorities against all motions showing apparent distaste for this kind of public criticism of mismanagement of funds. Note that no country solidarity from France was observed.

We also looked in detail at many particular events of voting sequences which we only briefly report here. We looked at important votes in 1998 on cohesion funds, reform of common agricultural policy, structural funds and on fisheries. None of these votes were fundamental in the sense that they represented fundamental changes to existing policies. They tended to be consensual and were most often the results of compromises worked out between the important party groups. Interestingly, in those cases, one sees many amendments proposed by smaller parties that are typically rejected. Many votes also concern particular formulation of sentences and are hardly consequential. Quite a few votes have a low party and country cohesion, especially in the area of CAP. This impression is however not validated by the broader statistical analysis. Another casual impression is that MEPs tend to amend Commission proposals by adding pro-environment sentences, and emphasizing general goals like employment creation and other social objectives without really changing the substance of Commission proposals.

A particularly heated, though not very consequential debate took place when the Renault plant was closed in Vilvoorde in Belgium to be relocated in France and when the workers came to the EP to protest. Apart from the staunch support received by workers on the left and the outright hostility on the right of the hemisphere, there were votes on a

resolution recommending the Commission to propose legislation on job transfers by multinational enterprises and recommending and asking for an evaluation of the EU directive on collective redundancies. Several right wing amendments to the initial resolution were voted down. Moderate amendments were accepted with GR, RAD and LEFT voting against. The final resolution was supported by the left and opposed by the right. The EPP voted for the resolution with 10% defection in its ranks. Most votes in this episode were clearly on the left-right dimension and parties showed relative cohesion. No precise pattern could be detected in the country votes. Another case of a particularly divided vote was a project of a resolution to evaluate the Essen Council. After various amendments where votes were clearly between the left and the right, the proposed resolution was rejected when the socialists dropped their support to the EPP and the liberals. The bone of contention was a difference in evaluation in the importance of the issue of fighting unemployment.

We looked at the debates on the 1999 budget which was approved by a large majority. The EP has limited power in changing the budget proposals of the Commission. Nevertheless, our impression is that it uses the little power it has to focus on issues like employment, education, the environment, regional development and convergence rather than agriculture or fishing. Corbett *et al.* (1999) who are thorough insiders to the EP make the same observation. It seems also that the EP plays more a role of a check on the Commission's spending plans rather than that of a big cash-spender. Various spending items get sent back to the Commission to ask for clarification before getting EP approval.

3.4. Spatial analysis

The evidence we showed so far only allows to pick up a single dimension to the political space in the European Parliament. However, one of the main findings of the empirical studies of the EU policy making is that there are at least two dimensions to the EU political space (e.g. Hix, 2001). These studies use the spatial framework developed by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) for use in the electoral arena and by Black (1948) for

use in legislative analysis. The spatial model has become the workhorse theory of modern legislative studies. In particular, the spatial model of voting has been extensively applied to the analysis of roll-call votes in the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Heckman and Snyder, 1997). The goal of the spatial model of roll-call voting is to estimate the ideal points of each legislator in a multi-dimensional policy space as well as the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ locations or the cutting lines for each vote on different dimensions of the policy space.

The spatial model assumes that each voter (legislator i) has an ideal position or bliss point (x_i) on different dimensions of a multi-dimensional policy space. It also assumes that in this space each roll call (vote j) is represented by two points ($z_{j,yes}$ and $z_{j,no}$) corresponding to the policy consequences of the voting outcomes (i.e. the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ outcomes). The legislator’s utility has two components, a deterministic and a stochastic component. For example, legislator i ’s utility when voting on roll call j can be represented by

$$u(x_i, z_j) = f(\delta(x_i, z_j)) + \varepsilon_{i,j} \quad (1)$$

where $\delta(x_i, z_j)$ is the distance between the ideal point of legislator and the vote outcome. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1), the deterministic component of the utility, is a negative function of the distance between the legislator’s ideal point and the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ outcomes of the vote. Therefore, the legislator is assumed to choose the vote (yes or no) closest to his or her ideal point alternative. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the stochastic component or the error term. It is a random variable and captures the effect of idiosyncratic ‘shock’ specific to legislator i when voting on roll call j , (i.e. the omitted attributes affecting the legislator’s choice). There is a big debate among political scientist about whether the method purely picks up legislators’ preferences or whether party positions are also picked up in the analysis. We need not be concerned with that question here as we are using the Poole and Rosenthal methodology mainly to scale voting behavior in a multi-dimensional space.

To estimate the spatial model, one must define a specific functional form for the deterministic component of the utility function and a probability distribution for the error

term. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have developed a procedure called NOMINATE to estimate the spatial model of roll call voting. NOMINATE postulates a bell-shape utility function for the deterministic part of the utility and a logit distribution for the error component. NOMINATE is very similar to standard factor models but given that there are a large number of parameters to be estimated and the utility function is bell-shaped, it uses a three-step estimation algorithm.⁸ Their approach has become the empirical workhorse model for the analysis of voting behavior in the U.S. Congress. It has also been used in legislatures outside the U.S. Congress such as the Czech republic (Noury, 1998), the U.N. assembly (Voeten, 2000) and the European Parliament (see Hix, 2001; Noury 2002).

We use the Poole-Rosenthal model to estimate the ideal position of each MEP and to analyze the dimensions of EP voting space for the third and fourth parliaments (see Noury, 2002 for a more detailed analysis). Different statistical criteria that measure the goodness-of-fit of the estimates suggest that there are at least two dimensions to the EU policy space. The first dimension that predicts correctly about 90% of MEP votes can easily be interpreted as the traditional left-right dimension. All left-wing parties (PES, GR, LEFT) are located on the left-hand side of the space, whereas right-wing parties (EPP, ELDR, GAUL) are on the opposite side. The second dimension adds only 2% more correct vote prediction and can also easily be interpreted as related to European integration. Parties in favor of European integration are located on the upper part of the space whereas anti-Europeans are located on the lower part. Figure 6 gives the scaling of individual MEP's in this two-dimensional space for the fourth Parliament. It is quite telling and shows clearly the left-right divide in the first dimension and the pro-anti European on the second dimension with the pro-integration PES and EPP on top and the anti-integration LEFT and GR on the left and the ANTI-EUR and GAUL on the right. Note the pivotal position of the liberals in the center of the political spectrum. Higher dimensions than those first two not only explain a negligible fraction of votes but they do not have an easy interpretation. This is particularly the case for the third parliament. As a

⁸ Note that in the EP there are thousands of parameters to be estimated as there are 626 MEP and more than 2700 votes in each legislature.

result, we conclude that the EP voting space is mainly two-dimensional. After the fourth parliament however, we find a third and fourth dimensions that have a sensible interpretation, though still remaining unimportant, i.e. predicting only respectively 0.8 and 1.2% more correct votes. In these dimensions MEPs from Nordic countries tend to be in opposition with MEPs from the South of Europe. We will discuss this more in detail later when we discuss the effect of enlargement.

INSERT FIGURE 6

The results from the spatial model once again suggest that legislators in the EP vote predominantly according to their European political group affiliations, mostly along the traditional left-right divide but also along the dimension of European integration. The presence of this dimension makes voting somewhat more complex than traditional legislative politics but positions on European integration are more clearly defined across parties than across countries even though support for integration clearly varies across countries. However, the extreme parties on the political spectrum (either to the right or to the left) have been opposed to European integration. By considering the dynamics of voting over time, Noury (2002) shows that in a multi-dimensional aspace, members of the European Parliament vote more and more according to party affiliation. This indicates that the European Parliament tends to behave increasingly like a “normal” European legislative body.

The results of the spatial model further indicate that the two dimensions of conflict are very stable across time. The correlation coefficients between the MEPs’ estimated bliss points across annual parliamentary sessions average 0.84 and 0.74 for the first and second dimensions, respectively. Compared to the US Congress however, the EP is far less stable.⁹ This fact can be explained by young age of the European legislature. The third and fourth dimensions) are only marginally important. Moreover, they are highly unstable. The results of the spatial model thus leads us to confirm our previous findings

⁹ According to Poole and Rosenthal (1997) from 1945 to 1980 the average correlation, for the first dimension, over consecutive two-year periods is 0.96 for the House.

that political parties are the main players of the policy-making game in the European Union.

4. THE EFFECT OF INCREASED POWERS AND ENLARGEMENT

After providing evidence of the prevailing role of party groups, as opposed to country interests, in explaining voting behavior, we now investigate via regression analysis the effect of increased powers and of enlargement on the voting behavior of MEPs.

The analysis focuses on party cohesion. Essentially, we ask whether more power and a larger size leads to larger cohesion. The question is important because strong party cohesion is a key element in the good functioning of national legislatures. It not only creates predictability but also prevents deadlock or inefficiency. Indeed, in a completely undisciplined legislative assembly, a majority must be secured for every new bill in the legislative period. Pivotal representatives can use this power to engage in logrolling deals where they obtain favors for their own constituencies or for special interests with which they are linked in one way or another. There is thus a great danger that legislative activity ends up in generalized logrolling of particularistic interests or that the holdup power of pivotal representatives makes it too costly to achieve majorities on bills of general interest. We know that in parliamentary democracies party discipline is strong and so is majority coalition discipline because of the presence of a vote of confidence for the government (Diermeier and Feddersen, 1999; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000). Note however that European institutions are not parliamentary. The European Commission is not chosen by the Parliament but by the Council and it is not the reflection of a majority coalition in the Parliament. In presidential democracies, party discipline is much less strong. Even in the US which has a majoritarian electoral system delivering a two-party system, party discipline is not as strong as in parliamentary democracies and there is much logrolling in legislative activity. Given that the EU is not a parliamentary democracy, it is thus not obvious at all that increased power of the European Parliament should increase cohesion of party groups. It could be possible that more power to the EP

increases the stakes of decision-making, and thus increases the expression of particularistic interests, and thus reduces cohesion. On the other hand, there are other existing mechanisms that may lead to more cohesion. First of all, party groups are composed of elected representatives of national parties and all EU countries are parliamentary democracies. National parties thus have obvious instruments to discipline MEP's. They can choose not to put them on an eligible place on the list for the election of the next EP. Moreover, national parties may affect the future careers of MEP's in their own country by denying them eligible places on lists for country elections or denying them other public mandates. Party groups in the EP are also organized in a similar way to party fractions in national parliaments. There are group "whips" who round up MEP's to vote in a particular way on bills. Presence in the EP is rather low. In the third parliament (fourth parliament, on average respectively 17.6% (16.8%) of MEP's were absent and 35.5% (21.6%) were present in the Parliament but did not vote. An important role for group whips is thus to round up MEP's to vote on particular issues.

We estimate the cohesion index (CI) for each political group on each vote. We thus have a "time-series" of over 6000 observations for each political group. The main exogenous variables of interest are:

- RELPRES, measuring the relative presence of a party group with respect to other groups. A high value for RELPRES should indicate that the issue vote on is relatively more important for that party group. We can thus expect tighter mobilization and control over voting behavior and thus a higher cohesion.
- Enlarge, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for votes taking place after enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden;
- Co-decision, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the voting procedure is co-decision, the one giving the most power to the parliament.

We also include a large number of control variables:

- QM, a dummy taking a value of 1 if the vote is by qualified majority,

- Leg4, a dummy to differentiate between the Third and the Fourth Parliament,
- PCTGVT1, measures the percentage of national parties of a group that are in government in their respective countries. The idea is to see whether representation of a party in the Council via the national governments has a positive or a negative effect on the cohesion of the MEPs of the same party.
- 11 dummies indicating the vote's policy issues as follows: 1- Foreign Policy; 2- Internal Functioning; 3- Agriculture, Fishing and Food; 4- Industries and Technology; 5- Banking System and Finance; 6- Drugs and Dangerous Substances; 7- Services; 8- Human Beings; 9- Security; 10- Nature; 11- Legal System; .

Since a large number of unobserved day-specific factors are at work that affect the legislators' decision-making behavior we included a day-specific dummy (μ_j) in our regression equations. We used the standard panel regression method. In order to take into account the fact that the CI index is not only bounded by 1 but is also heavily concentrated around 1 we divided the CI index by the observed majority. In other words, we used our weighted index as the dependent variable.¹⁰ The results of the regression analysis is reported in Table 18. Each entry shows the estimates for a given political group.

INSERT TABLES 18

The results show that RELPRES is statistically significant with a positive sign in all cases. This finding indicates that more participation leads to more party discipline, thus showing that the channel for more discipline is indeed the “rounding up” effect. The dummy for the fourth parliament is positive for a majority of political groups. However, neither the Enlarge nor the Co-decision variables are significant. Note also that presence in national governments of the same party does not affect cohesion. The main effect on cohesion is thus via party mobilization.

¹⁰ The unweighted CI was also estimated using a Tobit model which is usually used when distributions are limited (‘censored’) by an upper or lower bound. The results are not fundamentally different from the ones reported here.

Presence of MEPs of a party group is clearly not endogenous. We thus estimated also an equation trying to explain variation in presence of party members of a given group (PRES). We used the same explanatory variables as above and added closeness of the votes in the estimation of the presence equation, the assumption being that whips would mobilize their group more in case of a close vote. The results are shown in Table 19.

INSERT TABLE 19

The results of the PRES equation show that participation in the EP increases with more power, when a qualified majority is required and during the fourth parliament. The estimated coefficient of the Leg4 variable is significant with a positive sign meaning that there is less absence in the fourth parliament as compared with the third. The increase in participation over time can be explained, at least in part, by the decision (in 1996) to modify the rules governing reimbursement for attendance in Strasbourg. It is nevertheless compelling evidence for the increase in seriousness of the parliament. The results also show that Co-decision is significantly positive, thus showing that the Co-decision procedure mobilizes a larger number of legislators. Thus in the areas where the EP has more power, all political groups become more active. This result indicates that giving more power to the parliament has an unambiguously positive effect on participation. Note that this increase in participation is not an artifact of the absolute majority requirement (which is the case for a large number of Co-decision votes), since we explicitly control for the qualified majority requirement. The votes with a qualified majority indeed increase participation. Finally the enlargement estimates are either statistically positive (in 6 cases out of eight) or non-significant, but they never take a negative sign. Interestingly, this finding indicates that enlargement does not reduce but quite on the contrary increases participation. This finding indicates that enlargement does not imply more free-riding and more chaotic voting behavior.

Note that the joint estimation of our cohesion and presence equations produced qualitatively similar results. The results did not change either when we excluded from the sample the fully lopsided votes (i.e. when all MEPs voted in the same way).

The results of the two equations show that empowerment of the European Parliament does not have a *direct* effect on the cohesion and party discipline of political groups but an *indirect* effect via a higher presence. Enlargement does not have a negative but rather a positive effect on presence and thus on cohesion.

5. THE BEHAVIOR OF NEW ENTRANTS

The regressions above looked at aggregate effects of increases power and of enlargement in the cohesion of existing parties. In this section, we investigate the effects of enlargement by looking at the voting behavior of MEPs from the previous enlargement: Sweden, Finland and Austria who entered the EP in 1995. Focusing on the behavior of these MEPs from new entrant countries is potentially insightful in terms of what may happen with the next enlargement. Of course, we must be careful in drawing firm conclusions from such an exercise. The future accession countries do not have the same economic, cultural and historical background as the countries from the previous enlargement. Moreover, the number of entrants in the future enlargement will be much higher than in the previous one. Nevertheless, countries from the previous enlargement did have distinct characteristics from the EU. Two out of three were Nordic countries and all had a richer economy than the EU average. It is thus useful to see how MEPs from those countries behaved. In order to do this, we computed for each MEP a “discipline index” measuring the frequency of votes with his or her party group. The discipline index is different from the cohesion index in that it focuses on the voting behavior of individuals rather than groups. Table 20 gives the average frequency of vote of a MEP from a given country with his or her party. The last column looks at the average frequency of vote with the national delegation. The idea is to compare the relative loyalty of MEPs to their party and to their party group. This is done for the whole of the Fourth parliament since the enlargement to those three countries. The discipline index thus allows to see whether MEPs from new entrants behave differently from other MEPs.

INSERT TABLE 20

We immediately see that MEPs from Finland, Sweden and Austria do not behave in a less disciplined way toward their party group. Finnish socialists and liberals are among the most disciplined in their group. Swedish socialists are less disciplined than the other socialists but only slightly so and Swedish conservatives are very disciplined. Austrian MEPs are not less disciplined than the others. More importantly, for new entrants the discipline with the national delegation is significantly lower than the discipline with all the party groups. Moreover, the country discipline of the new entrants is not higher than for other countries. It is even among the lowest of all! This tends to strongly suggest that new entrants immediately follow the discipline of their group and do not follow country discipline more than other MEPs. The highest country discipline index is the one for the U.K. It must however be noted that over half of the British MEPs were Labor MEPs and that this explains to a great extent the greater cohesion. Other countries' distribution of MEPs over party groups is more dispersed. Note that France has the lowest national discipline index. The evidence from table 20 is encouraging because it tells us that new entrants do not display a different voting behavior than MEPs from other EU countries. In other words, the Parliament is capable of absorbing new members and integrate them quickly to party groups. Results of our regressions also showed that enlargement led to a higher presence which led to more cohesion.

So far, our analysis did not pick up any effect from enlargement. Here the spatial analysis proved useful. In particular, we asked what the effect is of new entrants on the dimensionality of politics in the EP. Figures 7a and b show a projection of the left-right dimension and the North-South dimension for the Third and the Fourth Parliament. MEPs from Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) are indicated with a N, MEPs from the poorer and Southern countries with a S (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Italy), MEPs from the UK with a X and MEPs from all other countries with a dot. The projection for the Third Parliament does not show any particular sorting of MEPs in the North-South dimension whereas the Fourth Parliament clearly does show such a sorting with Nordic MEPs in the top and Southern MEPs below. Thus, enlargement to Nordic countries did lead to the crystallization of a North-South dimension. This dimension is however very modest compared to the left-right dimension. The latter predicts 90% correct votes and the former adds a mere 1.2% correct votes.

The lesson from the previous enlargement is thus that MEPs from the new countries behaved like MEPs from other countries and were not less disciplined. However, enlargement to Nordic countries did tend to create a dimension of politics that was not present before, i.e. the North-South dimension. It is quite plausible that something similar will happen with the enlargement to the East. A new East-West dimension may appear or the North-South dimension may transform into a divide between rich and poor countries. The left-right dimension is however likely to remain dominant. Politicians from Central Europe are very eager to integrate the mainstream of Europe, and in particular its traditional party families. It is thus very unlikely that the importance of the left-right dimension will be substantially reduced.

A major difference between the next enlargement and the previous one is that in the latter case entrants were rich countries whereas the accession countries are poorer than Portugal, with the exception of Slovenia. In order to get a feel of the effect of poorer countries entering, it is useful to look at the behaviour of the “current poor” in the EU. In particular, one wants to know whether MEPs from poor countries remain more loyal to their party than to their country whenever there are votes on cohesion and structural funds which benefit poor countries. Here, we may expect national solidarity to be stronger than party loyalty for votes related to these issues. This is an important issue because entry of poorer countries from Central Europe will reinforce the political power of poor countries within the EU. How is this likely to be reflected in the EP? Table 21 shows the discipline index calculated only for votes related to structural funds and cohesion.

INSERT TABLE 21

We unambiguously see that MEPs from Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Ireland do not have lower party discipline than MEPs from the other countries. Party discipline thus tends to dominate even on issues where country interests would seem to take the upper hand. We looked further at the discipline of MEPs on the different issues (tables available upon request from the authors). We found that in general, across issues, party discipline remained stronger than country discipline with a few exceptions. The Greens are not

always cohesive, especially the Danish ones. On the issue of drugs, the Swedes have separate country views and small party discipline. On legal issues, party discipline is weak for Swedes and Austrians. Austrian liberals have weak party discipline for issues related to industry and technology. Belgian liberals are divided on agro-food, nature and drugs. German liberals are divided on agro-food and industry and technics. German greens are divided on foreign policy. Danish liberals have special views on drugs. Danes themselves are rather divided compared to the Germans for example. Spanish liberals are divided w.r.t. drugs and the legal system. In general, the French are not disciplined at all w.r.t. their country. Italian liberals are divided on nature. Irish conservatives are divided on drugs. Luxemburg socialists and liberals are very divided on votes related to industry and technics. On the whole however, discipline remains rather strong. Further analysis of specific issues should allow in particular to detect the possible effect of interest group politics on specific votes.

On the whole however, our inspection of the party loyalty of MEPs from the different countries does not tend to show a specific and important divide between groups of countries on particular sets of issues.

6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR ANALYSIS

What policy conclusions can we draw from our analysis? We must make a difference here between the safe inferences and the more speculative conclusions we can draw.

It is safe to conclude that giving more power to the EP would reinforce participation of MEPs in votes and thus cohesion of party groups. This comes clearly out of our regression analysis and it also makes sense. To the extent that votes carry no consequence, MEPs have less incentive to participate in votes and tend to be absentee representatives. Also, when they vote, they will have no incentive to be cohesive because the majority decision will not matter. Individual MEPs will prefer to stick as closely as possible to the interests of their constituency and to express their individual opinions through their vote. This is not a new idea. It is well known that less powerful assemblies tend to behave in a more chaotic way. When votes are however consequential, then party

groups will be active to mobilize the MEPs of their group to vote in a disciplined way in order to weigh effectively on decision-making.

What does one however mean by “more power to the EP”? What we have in mind and what comes naturally out of our analysis is increasing the power of the EP via a generalization of the co-decision procedure as the normal legislative procedure in the EU. Our analysis of the EP shows that MEPs have behaved more cohesively under the co-decision procedure. There is thus nothing to fear on that front from generalization of co-decision. We see two further arguments for a generalization of co-decision. First of all, simplification of legislative procedure by the adoption of a standard procedure will make the functioning of the EU seem less Byzantine and complex and more transparent to EU citizens. This is certainly very important in terms of enhancing legitimacy of the EU to European citizens, especially in the light of the Convention that will make recommendations for changes in the current Treaties. A second important argument is that the EP is the only directly elected political body in the EU. By giving more power to that body, one reduces the democratic deficit and makes Europe closer to the citizens. European elections will then be more than only “protest votes” on national issues and transform themselves gradually in campaigns over EU wide issues. Truly, the power of the Commission is reduced under co-decision. However, the Commission still keeps exclusive agenda-setting powers. Moreover, the Commission is not directly elected. It is chosen by the Council which is not directly elected either. Giving more power to the EP should thus bring the EU closer to European citizens.

Clearly there are ways of giving more power to the EP than simply generalizing the co-decision procedure. For example, if the initiative to form the Commission were taken away from the Council and given to the EP, this would represent a quantum leap in the power of the EP. Indeed, such a move would directly transform the EU into a genuine parliamentary system since the essence of the parliamentary system is a) the fact that the executive emerges from a majority coalition in the Parliament and b) the fact that the executive can be voted down directly by the Parliament. The EP currently has the latter power but not the former. Such a change would indeed profoundly change the nature of the Commission and change it into a form of parliamentary form of government. It is not

the place here to discuss the pro's and con's of such a change and the evidence provided in this paper only sheds light on some of the issues related to such a change. One must note however that moves to reduce the democratic deficit in the EU political decision-making process can only go in two directions: a move towards a parliamentary or toward a presidential system. There are no other functioning types of democracies in the world. Under the latter, the executive is directly elected by the population and cannot be voted down by the EP. Moves to reduce the democratic deficit must take place within that broad choice. Research on the costs and benefits of both types of regime in the European framework is clearly needed.

A less safe conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis is related to the effect of the coming enlargement on voting behavior in the EP. Our analysis of the previous enlargement suggests that party cohesion will not be negatively affected and most likely will be positively affected. This conclusion is however only based on the experience of past enlargement. The evidence we give is very fresh and useful because we are the first to do it using systematical analysis of roll-call data. However, it is a big logical leap to conclude from there that the next enlargement will have similar effects. We just cannot be certain. We are nevertheless quite optimistic in that respect. Indeed, even if party cohesion drops dramatically after enlargement, there will be competitive forces driving party groups in that direction. A cohesive party will realize that it can weigh more in decision-making when it is pivotal. Cohesion will make votes of the group more predictable. This in turn will make it more easy for a cohesive group to negotiate compromises with other groups. Less cohesive groups will thus have an incentive to become more cohesive.

A safer conclusion however is that increasing the power of the EP after enlargement can only improve legitimacy in the EU. Indeed, as decision-making in the Council will become increasingly difficult with 27 countries represented, an EP with more powers will be able to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and to exercise useful pressure and leadership vis a vis the Council which can only have a positive influence on the latter. Even without changing the voting rules for the Council that were decided in Nice, one can speculate that more power to the EP in an enlarged Europe will create positive

externalities for decision-making in the Council. The latter will still clearly exercise its veto powers. However, the exercise of those veto powers will happen in the shadow of the EP who will have more clout to shame Council members who would exercise this veto power to defend narrow national interests against proposals that are beneficial for the general public. Those veto powers will then most likely be used more sparingly only when important individual country interests are at stake, which is quite legitimate given the limited sovereignty individual countries have been ready to transfer to the EU level.

8. CONCLUSION.

We have used in this paper a unique data base to analyze the voting behavior of individual MEPs in the European Parliament for the Third and Fourth Parliament (1989-1994 and 1994-1999). We found that the cohesion of party groups was strong and increasing over time, even as the size of majorities in the EP has declined during that time period. Cohesion in the EP is comparable to cohesion in the US Congress though smaller than in parliamentary democracies. In contrast, country cohesion is small and generally not higher than cohesion of the EP as a whole. These findings are valid across policy dimensions, something we did not necessarily expect.

Our empirical analysis shows that the major dimension of coalition formation is ideology. In other words, party groups of the left tend to vote together against party groups of the right. However, the left-right dimension is not the only one and there are other dimensions at play like pro vs anti European integration and Northern vs Southern country interests. These additional dimensions are however less important than the left-right dimension.

We found that the channel for increased party cohesion works via the mobilization of MEPs by their party group to come to vote. This participation is stronger when the Parliament exercises more power through the co-decision procedure. The previous enlargement had a positive effect on participation and thus on cohesion. We also found

that MEPs from newly entering countries are not less disciplined than those from other countries. Discipline across issues is strong for all countries with a few qualifications.

We conclude that generalizing co-decision in the EP would further enhance cohesion. Giving more power to the EP is especially important given the coming enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 countries. The decisions of the Nice Treaty with respect to voting rules will make decision-making in the Council more difficult. More power to the EP and a weakening of the position of the Council should improve decision-making in the EU with respect to the Nice status quo.

Research on decision-making in the EP is in its infancy. The use of roll-call votes in the EP will help to better understand decision-making in the EP. We hope this work can contribute to knowledge like the work of Poole and Rosenthal has done for the analysis of the US Congress. Especially if the power of the EP becomes more and more important over the years.

References

Baldwin, R. E. Berglöf, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgrén (2001), *Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be Ratified? Monitoring European Integration 11 (MEI)*, London: CEPR.

Black, D. (1948) "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making." *Journal of Political Economy* 56:23–34.

Corbett, R., F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton, (2000) *The European Parliament*, Fourth edition Harper London.

Diermeier, D. and T. Feddersen (1998), "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure" *American-Political-Science-Review*, 92(3).

Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York: Harper and Row.

Heckman, J. and J. Snyder (1997) "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with An Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators", *Rand Journal of Economics*, 28(1).

Hix, S. (2001) "Legislative Behavior and Party Competition in the EP", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4).

Hotelling, H. (1929) "Stability in Competition." *Economic Journal* 39:41–57.

Kreppel A. and G. Tsebelis (1999) "Coalition Formation in the European Parliament", *Comparative Political Studies*, 32.

Noury, A. and E. Mielcova (1998) "Roll Call Voting in a Multi-Party Parliament: the Case of the Czech republic", CERGE-EI Discussion Paper.

Noury, A. W. Dobrowolski and M. Mazurkiewicz, "Voting Behavior in the Polish Parliament" mimeo, Free University of Brussels.

Noury, A. (2002) "Ideology, Nationality and Euro-parliamentarians", *European Union Politics*, 3(1).

Persson T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), "Comparative Politics and Public Finance", *Journal-of-Political-Economy*, 108 (6).

Poole, K. and H. Rosenthal (1997) *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raunio Tapio *The European Perspective: Transnational Party Groups in the 1989-1994 European Parliament*, London: Ashgat.

Rice, Stewart, (1928) *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, New York, Knopf.

Turnovec, F. 1996. "Weights and Votes in European Union, Extension and Institutional Reform", *Prague Economic Papers*, 5, 2: 161-174.

Voeten, E. (2000) "Clashes in the Assembly" *International Organization*, 54(2).

TABLE 1. Party Families in the European Parliament

Party Family	Abbreviation	Party Group Name(s) used across time	Size in the 4 th EP (1997)
Party of European Socialists	PES	PES	216 (34.2%)
European People's Party – Christian Democrats and Conservatives	EPP	EPP, ED, EPP-ED	181 (28.9%)
European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party	ELDR	ELD, ELDR groups	43 (6.9%)
Greens and allies	GR	RBW, G, G/EFA	28 (4.5%)
Gaullists and allies	GAUL	EPD, EDA, UFE, UEN	57 (9.1%)
Radical Left and Italian Communists and allies	LEFT	COM, LU, EUL/NGL, EUL	33 (5.3%)
Radicals and Regionalists	RAD	ERA	20 (3.2%)
Anti-Europeans	ANTI-EU	EN, I-EN, EDD	18 (2.9%)
Non-attached and Independents	NA	IND	32 (5.1%)

Figure 1. The Cooperation procedure (second reading).

Figure 2. The Co-decision procedure(second reading)

TABLE 2

Mean cohesion index of parties for the third and fourth parliaments (standard deviations in parenthesis).										
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	Eur. Parl.
Third parliament	0.87	0.85	0.77	0.82	0.80	0.80	0.83	0.64	0.74	0.58
	(.21)	(.22)	(.29)	(.24)	(.29)	(.33)	(.35)	(.4)	(.36)	(.32)
Fourth parliament	0.87	0.86	0.80	0.88	0.72	0.74	0.88	0.56	0.51	0.52
	(.2)	(.2)	(.23)	(.22)	(.33)	(.31)	(.25)	(.37)	(.38)	(.31)

PES: Party of European Socialists ; EPP: European People's Party - Christian Democrats & Conservatives ; ELDR: European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party ; GR: Greens & allies; GAUL: Gaullists & allies; LEFT: Radical Left and Italian Communists & allies ; RAD: Radicals, regionalists & allies; ANTI-EU: Anti-Europeans; NA: Non-attached and Independents

TABLE 3

Mean cohesion index of countries for the third and fourth parliaments (standard deviations in parenthesis).

	F	UK	I	IRL	FND	SW	D	GR	NL	E	B	P	AST	DK	L	Eur. Parl.
Third parliament	0.48	0.7	0.63	0.66	-	-	0.62	0.73	0.66	0.73	0.56	0.68	-	0.65	0.79	0.58
	(.33)	(.35)	(.35)	(.35)			(.35)	(.35)	(.34)	(.3)	(.34)	.35)		(.38)	(.35)	(.32)
Fourth parliament	0.44	0.76	0.57	0.55	0.57	0.49	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.52	0.58	0.59	0.52	0.66	0.52
	(.33)	(.24)	(.33)	(.35)	(.35)	(.35)	(.37)	(.35)	(.32)	(.36)	(.31)	(.34)	(.36)	(.38)	(.38)	(.31)

F: France; U.K.: United Kingdom; I: Italy; IRL: Ireland; FND: Finland; SW: Sweden; D: Germany; GR: Greece; NL: Netherlands; E: Spain; B: Belgium; P: Portugal; AST: Austria; DK: Denmark; L: Luxembourg.

Figure 3. The distribution of majority sizes in the Third and Fourth Parliament.

TABLE 4
Mean weighted cohesion index of parties for the third and fourth parliament (standard deviations in parenthesis).

	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA
Third parliament									
	0.85	0.83	0.75	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.82	0.64	0.74
	(.26)	(.28)	(.30)	(.29)	(.33)	(.38)	(.40)	(.44)	(.40)
Fourth parliament									
	0.86	0.85	0.78	0.89	0.71	0.74	0.87	0.54	0.51
	(.27)	(.26)	(.27)	(.31)	(.36)	(.37)	(.32)	(.38)	(.41)

TABLE 5
Mean weighted cohesion index of countries for the third and fourth parliament (standard deviations in parenthesis).

	F	UK	I	IRL	FND	SW	D	GR	NL	E	B	P	AST	DK	L
Third parliament															
	0.45	0.63	0.57	0.63	-	-	0.56	0.68	0.60	0.68	0.51	0.63	-	0.62	0.76
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.34)			(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.29)		(0.37)	(0.36)
Fourth parliament															
	0.41	0.72	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.47	0.53	0.54	0.50	0.62
	(.30)	(.20)	(.27)	(.32)	(.30)	(.32)	(.30)	(.30)	(.27)	(.30)	(.26)	(.29)	(.30)	(.38)	(.35)

Table 6. The Cohesion Index for Votes with lower majorities in the Third Parliament

	Majority less than or equal than															
	100%		95%		90%		85%		80%		75%		70%		65%	
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
PES	0.867	0.21	0.829	0.23	0.801	0.25	0.777	0.26	0.760	0.28	0.768	0.28	0.782	0.27	0.791	0.26
EPP	0.845	0.22	0.805	0.24	0.776	0.26	0.758	0.27	0.757	0.26	0.768	0.26	0.786	0.24	0.806	0.23
ELDR	0.770	0.29	0.715	0.30	0.681	0.31	0.657	0.31	0.651	0.30	0.644	0.30	0.652	0.30	0.657	0.29
GR	0.817	0.24	0.789	0.24	0.793	0.23	0.803	0.23	0.802	0.23	0.806	0.23	0.810	0.23	0.798	0.23
GAUL	0.798	0.29	0.759	0.31	0.747	0.31	0.740	0.30	0.738	0.30	0.741	0.29	0.743	0.29	0.748	0.29
LEFT	0.801	0.33	0.756	0.35	0.746	0.35	0.759	0.35	0.767	0.35	0.788	0.33	0.787	0.33	0.780	0.33
RAD	0.830	0.35	0.790	0.37	0.782	0.38	0.781	0.38	0.791	0.37	0.797	0.37	0.806	0.37	0.788	0.38
ANTI-EU	0.640	0.40	0.620	0.41	0.617	0.41	0.612	0.41	0.623	0.41	0.630	0.41	0.631	0.42	0.630	0.42
NA	0.739	0.36	0.724	0.36	0.716	0.37	0.715	0.37	0.711	0.37	0.711	0.37	0.708	0.37	0.704	0.37
F	0.485	0.33	0.370	0.28	0.322	0.26	0.297	0.25	0.289	0.25	0.282	0.25	0.272	0.24	0.256	0.24
UK	0.696	0.35	0.608	0.36	0.532	0.36	0.461	0.34	0.405	0.32	0.374	0.30	0.357	0.30	0.338	0.29
I	0.626	0.35	0.522	0.34	0.444	0.32	0.398	0.31	0.362	0.29	0.332	0.28	0.310	0.26	0.305	0.26
IRE	0.659	0.35	0.573	0.34	0.530	0.34	0.509	0.33	0.504	0.33	0.503	0.33	0.506	0.33	0.528	0.33
D	0.620	0.35	0.521	0.34	0.439	0.33	0.357	0.31	0.289	0.28	0.230	0.24	0.195	0.21	0.171	0.19
GR	0.734	0.35	0.656	0.36	0.588	0.37	0.519	0.37	0.456	0.36	0.410	0.34	0.383	0.33	0.368	0.33
NL	0.660	0.34	0.565	0.33	0.487	0.32	0.422	0.31	0.370	0.30	0.319	0.28	0.285	0.26	0.267	0.24
E	0.733	0.29	0.654	0.30	0.589	0.29	0.521	0.28	0.468	0.27	0.418	0.25	0.390	0.24	0.357	0.22
B	0.565	0.34	0.459	0.31	0.389	0.30	0.337	0.29	0.303	0.28	0.270	0.27	0.248	0.26	0.228	0.25
P	0.682	0.35	0.591	0.35	0.523	0.34	0.471	0.33	0.433	0.32	0.409	0.31	0.401	0.30	0.374	0.30
DK	0.650	0.38	0.571	0.38	0.528	0.38	0.514	0.38	0.510	0.38	0.498	0.38	0.484	0.38	0.468	0.38
L	0.790	0.35	0.736	0.38	0.687	0.39	0.637	0.40	0.596	0.41	0.566	0.40	0.543	0.40	0.517	0.40

Table 7. The Cohesion Index for Votes with lower majorities in the Fourth Parliament.

	Majority less than or equal than															
	100%		95%		90%		85%		80%		75%		70%		65%	
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
PES	0.867	0.20	0.847	0.21	0.825	0.22	0.797	0.24	0.787	0.25	0.793	0.26	0.812	0.25	0.841	0.23
EPP	0.862	0.19	0.843	0.20	0.825	0.21	0.802	0.23	0.796	0.23	0.800	0.23	0.810	0.22	0.834	0.20
ELDR	0.798	0.23	0.770	0.24	0.751	0.24	0.731	0.25	0.723	0.25	0.723	0.25	0.724	0.25	0.732	0.24
GR	0.884	0.22	0.876	0.22	0.886	0.21	0.893	0.20	0.898	0.20	0.901	0.20	0.907	0.19	0.910	0.19
GAUL	0.717	0.33	0.686	0.33	0.684	0.32	0.682	0.32	0.690	0.32	0.698	0.32	0.706	0.32	0.720	0.31
LEFT	0.739	0.31	0.716	0.32	0.720	0.31	0.731	0.31	0.748	0.30	0.762	0.30	0.765	0.30	0.771	0.30
RAD	0.876	0.25	0.862	0.26	0.850	0.27	0.841	0.27	0.846	0.27	0.850	0.27	0.851	0.27	0.856	0.27
ANTI-EU	0.556	0.37	0.533	0.37	0.518	0.36	0.504	0.36	0.503	0.36	0.505	0.36	0.501	0.36	0.502	0.36
NA	0.513	0.38	0.491	0.38	0.488	0.38	0.483	0.38	0.495	0.38	0.500	0.39	0.508	0.39	0.515	0.39
F	0.437	0.33	0.375	0.31	0.354	0.30	0.340	0.29	0.332	0.29	0.330	0.29	0.316	0.29	0.299	0.28
UK	0.760	0.24	0.722	0.24	0.683	0.24	0.625	0.22	0.590	0.20	0.569	0.19	0.566	0.18	0.569	0.16
I	0.571	0.33	0.507	0.32	0.450	0.31	0.391	0.29	0.339	0.28	0.307	0.26	0.284	0.25	0.255	0.23
IRE	0.550	0.35	0.484	0.33	0.444	0.32	0.420	0.31	0.407	0.30	0.413	0.30	0.418	0.30	0.413	0.30
FIN	0.570	0.35	0.504	0.33	0.447	0.32	0.393	0.30	0.361	0.29	0.350	0.28	0.345	0.27	0.337	0.27
SW	0.493	0.35	0.434	0.33	0.402	0.32	0.375	0.30	0.361	0.29	0.362	0.28	0.367	0.28	0.367	0.28
D	0.635	0.37	0.574	0.38	0.503	0.37	0.398	0.36	0.301	0.32	0.234	0.27	0.186	0.23	0.152	0.19
GR	0.625	0.35	0.568	0.35	0.509	0.35	0.424	0.34	0.359	0.32	0.314	0.30	0.287	0.30	0.252	0.27
NL	0.619	0.32	0.562	0.32	0.508	0.31	0.442	0.29	0.392	0.27	0.371	0.25	0.352	0.24	0.339	0.22
E	0.634	0.36	0.573	0.36	0.508	0.36	0.416	0.34	0.337	0.32	0.276	0.29	0.242	0.28	0.209	0.25
B	0.516	0.31	0.458	0.29	0.401	0.28	0.334	0.26	0.285	0.24	0.262	0.23	0.248	0.22	0.231	0.21
P	0.576	0.34	0.513	0.33	0.457	0.32	0.389	0.30	0.342	0.29	0.315	0.28	0.298	0.27	0.280	0.26
AST	0.591	0.36	0.527	0.35	0.470	0.34	0.393	0.32	0.338	0.29	0.300	0.28	0.278	0.26	0.264	0.25
DK	0.520	0.38	0.468	0.37	0.435	0.37	0.404	0.36	0.390	0.35	0.391	0.35	0.395	0.35	0.391	0.35
L	0.664	0.38	0.613	0.39	0.553	0.39	0.471	0.38	0.403	0.37	0.362	0.35	0.329	0.34	0.316	0.33

Table 8. Eleven broad categories of issues

Broad issue	Number of votes
Foreign Policy	769
Internal Functioning and Policy	1528
Agriculture, Fishing and Food	888
Industry and Technology	523
Banking and Finance	313
Drugs and Dangerous Substances	169
Services	137
Human Beings	709
Security	368
Nature	433
Legal System	229

TABLE 9a. Cohesion per issue in the Third Parliament

	Foreign Policy	Internal Functioning	Agro-fish	Industry and Technology	Banking and Finance	Drugs	Services	Human Beings	Security	Nature	Legal System
Parties											
PES	0.842	0.882	0.836	0.847	0.834	0.855	0.904	0.919	0.865	0.898	0.827
EPP	0.855	0.868	0.801	0.832	0.828	0.754	0.894	0.865	0.908	0.808	0.845
ELDR	0.795	0.799	0.704	0.748	0.757	0.676	0.855	0.787	0.835	0.718	0.769
GR	0.777	0.798	0.797	0.853	0.798	0.856	0.860	0.851	0.843	0.884	0.806
GAUL	0.776	0.783	0.849	0.797	0.848	0.764	0.892	0.807	0.777	0.806	0.757
LEFT	0.787	0.785	0.759	0.754	0.749	0.891	0.874	0.842	0.873	0.881	0.788
RAD	0.799	0.762	0.803	0.882	0.842	0.881	0.955	0.891	0.936	0.866	0.962
ANTI-EU	0.610	0.630	0.621	0.576	0.699	0.653	0.499	0.676	0.779	0.656	0.608
NA	0.732	0.717	0.753	0.762	0.794	0.791	0.690	0.724	0.839	0.725	0.726
Mean CI	0.818	0.835	0.803	0.813	0.819	0.799	0.872	0.859	0.867	0.830	0.776
Countries											
F	0.446	0.506	0.470	0.489	0.468	0.474	0.584	0.471	0.486	0.533	0.511
UK	0.666	0.765	0.717	0.590	0.741	0.644	0.689	0.648	0.699	0.711	0.656
I	0.546	0.701	0.646	0.566	0.611	0.537	0.729	0.605	0.693	0.654	0.520
IRE	0.631	0.672	0.633	0.654	0.744	0.622	0.825	0.633	0.718	0.634	0.676
D	0.564	0.684	0.618	0.532	0.583	0.596	0.674	0.563	0.718	0.724	0.603
GR	0.684	0.771	0.802	0.724	0.672	0.746	0.852	0.687	0.776	0.750	0.726
NL	0.654	0.700	0.656	0.596	0.620	0.565	0.649	0.643	0.746	0.718	0.603
E	0.713	0.767	0.749	0.684	0.726	0.685	0.788	0.692	0.796	0.755	0.745
B	0.527	0.593	0.621	0.506	0.545	0.463	0.672	0.546	0.602	0.612	0.540
P	0.646	0.700	0.725	0.668	0.636	0.678	0.751	0.632	0.751	0.755	0.640
DK	0.643	0.611	0.680	0.626	0.674	0.671	0.680	0.654	0.754	0.707	0.634
L	0.813	0.785	0.843	0.843	0.731	0.758	0.819	0.744	0.820	0.756	0.800

Mean CI is the average Cohesion Index weighted by party size.

TABLE 9b. Cohesion per issue in the Fourth Parliament

	Foreign Policy	Internal Functioning	Agro-Fish	Industry and Technology	Banking and Finance	Drugs	Services	Human Beings	Security	Nature	Legal System
Parties											
PES	0.890	0.869	0.846	0.827	0.903	0.734	0.956	0.901	0.886	0.878	0.807
EPP	0.869	0.854	0.833	0.894	0.887	0.798	0.895	0.857	0.924	0.850	0.879
ELDR	0.835	0.779	0.790	0.818	0.838	0.605	0.852	0.799	0.834	0.823	0.805
GR	0.862	0.796	0.940	0.948	0.866	0.800	0.894	0.938	0.844	0.978	0.918
GAUL	0.671	0.659	0.719	0.767	0.819	0.803	0.856	0.727	0.607	0.772	0.748
LEFT	0.712	0.666	0.755	0.748	0.679	0.591	0.598	0.839	0.739	0.826	0.818
RAD	0.855	0.892	0.883	0.809	0.888	0.819	0.948	0.886	0.852	0.889	0.892
ANTI-EU	0.587	0.611	0.550	0.459	0.635	0.498	0.450	0.588	0.565	0.471	0.541
NA	0.539	0.465	0.584	0.426	0.486	0.544	0.593	0.600	0.525	0.407	0.563
Mean CI	0.819	0.805	0.806	0.806	0.841	0.736	0.869	0.835	0.836	0.820	0.770
Countries											
F	0.417	0.391	0.508	0.480	0.514	0.396	0.498	0.447	0.397	0.367	0.418
UK	0.767	0.765	0.779	0.717	0.816	0.641	0.864	0.744	0.772	0.748	0.693
I	0.577	0.593	0.558	0.531	0.704	0.543	0.533	0.542	0.636	0.489	0.599
IRE	0.532	0.555	0.561	0.500	0.656	0.464	0.493	0.630	0.496	0.458	0.546
FIN	0.551	0.565	0.586	0.574	0.523	0.497	0.602	0.579	0.573	0.624	0.561
SW	0.470	0.466	0.510	0.465	0.415	0.625	0.667	0.546	0.401	0.647	0.429
D	0.652	0.715	0.633	0.504	0.702	0.393	0.674	0.596	0.643	0.566	0.665
GR	0.622	0.654	0.649	0.543	0.724	0.534	0.678	0.597	0.656	0.512	0.658
NL	0.658	0.646	0.621	0.597	0.589	0.503	0.658	0.563	0.654	0.609	0.653
E	0.648	0.688	0.643	0.548	0.706	0.550	0.673	0.597	0.649	0.514	0.685
B	0.526	0.547	0.525	0.455	0.560	0.408	0.598	0.501	0.516	0.455	0.520
P	0.563	0.585	0.562	0.547	0.673	0.440	0.601	0.550	0.617	0.514	0.619
AST	0.590	0.614	0.592	0.484	0.772	0.468	0.661	0.586	0.557	0.626	0.541
DK	0.521	0.451	0.550	0.524	0.595	0.425	0.659	0.598	0.462	0.677	0.474
L	0.687	0.715	0.655	0.586	0.798	0.400	0.755	0.666	0.695	0.592	0.699

Mean CI is the average Cohesion Index weighted by party size.

TABLE 10.
Cohesion Index in the Belgian Parliament (30/06/1995 to 18/12/1997)

Parties				
Part family	Parties	Mean	Std	Size (# of MPs)
1 Christian Democrats	CVP, PSC	0.987	0.08	41
2 Socialists	SP, PS	0.978	0.10	43
3 Liberals	VLD, PRL	0.730	0.38	39
4 Regional parties	VU	0.953	0.16	5
5 Green	ECOLO, AGALEV	0.983	0.09	10
6 Extreme right	VB, FN	0.953	0.11	12
Average		0.931	0.15	25
Regions				
1 F	Flemish	0.315	0.29	92
2 W	Francophone	0.422	0.31	59
Average		0.315	0.29	92
Parliament				
CI (all Parliament)		0.356	0.28	150

Number of Roll-Call Votes: 2080

Key:

CVP	Christelijke Volkspartij
AGALEV	Anders gaan arbeiden, leven en vrijen
VLD	Vlaamse liberalen en democraten
VU	Volskunie
VB	Vlaams Blok
SP	Socialistische Partij
PSC	Parti social-chrétien
ECOLO	Ecolo
PRL	Parti réformateur libéral
FN	Front national
PS	Parti socialiste

TABLE 11.

Average abstention and presence in the Belgian and European Parliament
(in % of the number of representatives)

	BELGIAN PARLIAMENT 1995-1997	EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 1996-1999
Yes votes	40.11	36.73
No votes	43.09	27.08
Abstentions	6.98	2.28
Absences	9.77	34.19
TOTAL	100	100

TABLE 12. Cohesion in the US Congress.

	Democrats	Republicans	Congress	Relative cohesion of Democrats	Relative cohesion of Republicans
1991-92	0.76	0.67	0.45	1.67	1.48
std	0.28	0.30	0.31		
1993-94	0.76	0.74	0.39	1.95	1.89
std	0.27	0.28	0.31		
1995-96	0.68	0.83	0.37	1.84	2.25
std	0.29	0.25	0.31		
1997-98	0.73	0.81	0.46	1.59	1.77
std	0.29	0.25	0.36		
1999-2000	0.78	0.82	0.52	1.51	1.57
std	0.26	0.26	0.39		

Source of data : Keith Poole. (URL: <http://voteview.uh.edu/default.htm>)

Table 14a. Correlations of intensity of majority support of countries in the Third Parliament.

[illegible]

Table 14b. Correlations of intensity of majority support of countries in the Fourth Parliament.

[illegible]

Figure 4. Frequency of the number of parties in the majority in the third and fourth parliament.

Figure 5. Frequency of the number of countries in the majority in the third and fourth parliament.

Table 15 Vote on a Green resolution of voting the motion of censure before resolutions on discharge of the 1996 budget.

Parties										Eur. Parl.
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	
Yes	25	3	1	20	2	15	3	13	17	99
No	166	154	39	0	36	8	12	4	10	429
Abs	2	2	1	2	1	4	1	1	0	14
No of votes	193	159	41	22	39	27	16	18	27	542

Countries																Eur. Parl.
	F	UK	I	IRL	FND	SW	D	GR	NL	E	B	P	AST	DK	L	
Yes	24	5	5	2	1	7	30	5	1	1	7	3	6	2	0	99
No	41	76	59	12	13	13	56	13	25	54	18	20	13	10	6	429
Abs	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	2	3	0	0	2	0	0	14
No of votes	67	81	66	14	14	21	86	20	28	58	25	23	21	12	6	542

TABLE 16. Vote on the resolution on “improving the financial management of the Commission”

Parties										Eur. Parl.
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	
Yes	174	67	4	2	35	12	13	1	11	319
No	3	89	7	18	2	9	2	11	16	157
Abs	1	7	30	3	3	3	1	6	0	54
No of votes	178	163	41	23	40	24	16	18	27	530

Countries																Eur. Parl.
	F	UK	I	IRL	FND	SW	D	GR	NL	E	B	P	AST	DK	L	
Yes	35	61	58	10	5	7	18	11	13	57	8	19	6	5	6	319
No	23	16	5	2	6	11	53	3	4	1	13	4	15	1	0	157
Abs	5	3	3	2	4	3	3	6	12	1	4	1	0	7	0	54
No of votes	63	80	66	14	15	21	74	20	29	59	25	24	21	13	6	530

Table 17. Vote on the motion of censure for the commission.

Parties											
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU	NA	Eur. Parl.	
Yes	38	69	32	24	14	18	4	16	17	232	
No	157	72	9	0	26	4	13	2	10	293	
Abs	2	21	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	27	
No of votes	197	162	41	24	42	22	19	18	27	552	

Countries																	
	F	UK	I	IRL	FND	SW	D	GR	NL	E	B	P	AST	DK	L	Eur. Parl.	
Yes	39	20	9	3	3	13	86	6	13	1	14	5	11	9	0	232	
No	28	57	58	11	9	6	6	11	8	52	8	19	10	4	6	293	
Abs	6	3	0	0	3	2	0	3	7	0	3	0	0	0	0	27	
No of votes	73	80	67	14	15	21	92	20	28	53	25	24	21	13	6	552	

FIGURE 6.

MEPs' Ideal Points, EP 4 (1994-1999)

The ideal positions of MEPs on two-dimensional space

Symbols representing MEPs as follows: 's'= PES, 'p'=EPP, 'L'=ELDR, 'G'=GR, 'C'=LEFT, 'U'=GAUL, 'R'=RAD, 'A'=ANTI-EU, 'N'=NA

Table 18 The results of the estimation of the weighted cohesion equation (Random Effect model).

Dependent Variable: Relative Cohesion Index								
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU
PCT_GVT	-0.021 (0.20)	0.035 (0.56)	-0.093 (0.55)	-0.146 (1.61)	0.110 (1.98)*	-0.281 (2.50)*	-	-
RELPRES	0.294 (2.35)*	0.610 (4.96)**	1.364 (3.67)**	2.190 (6.75)**	1.074 (2.27)*	1.330 (2.40)*	-3.605 (3.42)**	-8.117 (9.27)**
Enlarge	-0.036 (0.73)	-0.015 (0.37)	-0.057 (0.81)	-0.009 (0.15)	0.115 (1.97)*	-0.018 (0.31)	-0.031 (0.51)	-0.150 (1.97)*
Co-decision	-0.033 (1.59)	-0.028 (1.38)	-0.016 (0.73)	0.013 (0.57)	0.033 (1.20)	-0.021 (0.75)	0.011 (0.39)	-0.140 (4.40)**
QM	0.043 (2.23)*	-0.022 (1.13)	0.026 (1.26)	0.056 (2.55)*	0.002 (0.09)	0.100 (3.79)**	0.040 (1.54)	-0.009 (0.32)
Leg4	0.113 (2.37)*	0.093 (2.20)*	0.123 (2.21)*	0.221 (3.89)**	-0.236 (3.68)**	-0.002 (0.04)	0.148 (2.38)*	0.119 (1.56)
ForPol	0.002 (0.10)	0.028 (1.12)	0.093 (3.54)**	-0.047 (1.69)	-0.074 (2.32)*	-0.059 (1.76)	-0.064 (1.89)	-0.086 (2.25)*
Internal	-0.023 (1.01)	-0.013 (0.56)	0.006 (0.24)	-0.091 (3.61)**	-0.105 (3.59)**	-0.150 (4.91)**	-0.021 (0.70)	-0.031 (0.89)
AgroFish	0.005 (0.21)	0.011 (0.46)	0.016 (0.64)	0.054 (2.03)*	-0.029 (0.94)	-0.021 (0.64)	0.012 (0.37)	-0.026 (0.71)
Industry	0.029 (1.11)	0.091 (3.51)**	0.073 (2.62)**	0.113 (3.83)**	0.011 (0.31)	-0.028 (0.79)	0.041 (1.16)	-0.105 (2.58)**
Bank	-0.033 (1.09)	0.004 (0.12)	0.037 (1.13)	-0.055 (1.61)	0.006 (0.16)	-0.147 (3.55)**	-0.025 (0.58)	-0.040 (0.85)
Drug	-0.011 (0.31)	0.016 (0.45)	-0.062 (1.65)	0.025 (0.63)	0.053 (1.16)	-0.058 (1.19)	0.087 (1.80)	-0.069 (1.28)
Services	0.119 (2.72)**	0.099 (2.31)*	0.114 (2.42)*	-0.017 (0.34)	0.058 (1.01)	-0.037 (0.61)	0.085 (1.41)	-0.105 (1.51)
Humans	0.059 (2.37)*	0.043 (1.76)	0.050 (1.89)	0.045 (1.61)	-0.040 (1.25)	0.027 (0.81)	0.014 (0.41)	-0.037 (0.96)
Security	-0.020 (0.71)	0.068 (2.41)*	0.045 (1.51)	-0.065 (2.03)*	-0.191 (5.19)**	-0.074 (1.93)	-0.020 (0.51)	0.011 (0.26)
Nature	0.005 (0.17)	-0.013 (0.48)	-0.002 (0.08)	0.073 (2.33)*	-0.013 (0.37)	0.037 (0.95)	0.019 (0.50)	-0.053 (1.24)
Legal	-0.033 (0.96)	0.024 (0.70)	-0.014 (0.37)	0.011 (0.28)	-0.066 (1.48)	-0.026 (0.55)	0.142 (2.94)**	-0.081 (1.51)
Constant	0.978 (11.64)**	0.828 (13.66)**	0.895 (10.44)**	0.901 (25.01)**	0.987 (23.17)**	1.057 (29.13)**	1.111 (32.95)**	1.046 (25.61)**
N	6444	6443	6430	6426	6349	6311	5788	6179
# of days	479	479	479	478	476	476	454	472
Chi2(19)	61	91	82	261	102	123	68	141
P-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 19 The results of the estimation of the PRES equation (Random Effect model).

	Dependent Variable: Presence							
	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI-EU
Close	49.036 (3.59)**	33.255 (3.04)**	8.589 (3.07)**	7.232 (3.40)**	5.727 (1.99)*	11.125 (5.22)**	4.138 (3.59)**	3.658 (2.82)**
Enlarge	21.855 (2.46)*	11.442 (1.60)	8.409 (4.68)**	4.535 (3.88)**	1.232 (0.65)	4.069 (3.08)**	1.817 (2.35)*	2.827 (3.35)**
Co-decision	9.270 (6.18)**	5.718 (4.75)**	0.664 (2.16)*	1.163 (4.89)**	1.639 (5.18)**	0.213 (0.90)	0.689 (5.44)**	0.712 (4.99)**
QM	13.728 (9.86)**	12.125 (10.86)**	2.681 (9.39)**	1.154 (5.22)**	2.599 (8.85)**	0.824 (3.77)**	0.635 (5.41)**	0.400 (3.02)**
leg4	19.927 (2.24)*	31.008 (4.34)**	3.241 (1.81)	-3.523 (3.01)**	14.634 (7.72)**	3.887 (2.94)**	4.904 (6.34)**	2.065 (2.45)*
ForPol	4.120 (2.28)*	2.604 (1.80)	0.882 (2.38)*	0.877 (3.06)**	0.941 (2.47)*	1.060 (3.74)**	0.818 (5.37)**	0.413 (2.40)*
Internal	24.187 (14.71)**	18.748 (14.21)**	4.101 (12.16)**	2.025 (7.76)**	4.356 (12.55)**	2.291 (8.88)**	1.665 (11.99)**	1.676 (10.71)**
AgroFish	10.995 (6.26)**	6.678 (4.74)**	1.741 (4.83)**	1.197 (4.30)**	3.516 (9.48)**	0.479 (1.74)	0.764 (5.15)**	0.955 (5.71)**
Industry	4.817 (2.45)*	0.424 (0.27)	0.143 (0.36)	0.510 (1.64)	1.564 (3.78)**	-0.500 (1.62)	0.378 (2.28)*	0.241 (1.29)
Bank	13.735 (6.18)**	12.376 (6.94)**	1.810 (3.97)**	0.547 (1.55)	2.956 (6.30)**	0.823 (2.36)*	0.607 (3.24)**	0.753 (3.56)**
Drug	1.848 (0.70)	-2.592 (1.23)	0.007 (0.01)	0.202 (0.49)	0.330 (0.60)	-1.818 (4.42)**	-0.279 (1.26)	0.020 (0.08)
Services	7.249 (2.12)*	2.736 (1.00)	1.124 (1.61)	0.225 (0.42)	0.706 (0.98)	-1.657 (3.10)**	-0.198 (0.69)	-0.447 (1.38)
Humans	3.243 (1.77)	-2.546 (1.73)	0.057 (0.15)	0.141 (0.49)	-0.063 (0.16)	0.432 (1.50)	0.361 (2.34)*	-0.059 (0.34)
Security	12.554 (6.06)**	8.328 (5.01)**	2.358 (5.55)**	1.886 (5.74)**	1.655 (3.79)**	1.284 (3.95)**	0.844 (4.83)**	1.078 (5.47)**
Nature	7.731 (3.82)**	5.440 (3.35)**	1.183 (2.85)**	1.286 (4.01)**	3.145 (7.37)**	0.228 (0.72)	1.117 (6.54)**	1.208 (6.28)**
Legal	11.684 (4.66)**	7.515 (3.74)**	2.585 (5.03)**	1.217 (3.06)**	1.690 (3.20)**	0.480 (1.22)	1.206 (5.70)**	1.327 (5.57)**
Constant	67.232 (17.66)**	56.836 (18.57)**	10.641 (13.72)**	11.730 (21.09)**	3.104 (3.84)**	3.462 (5.94)**	-0.317 (0.97)	2.148 (5.93)**
N	5967	5967	5967	5967	5967	5967	5967	5967
# of days	421	421	421	421	421	421	421	421
Chi2(17)	786	1007	761	235	1068	506	862	586
P-Value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Closeness (close) is instrumented by lagged closeness.

TABLE 9. The Discipline index of MEP's The average frequency of vote of a MEP with party group or national delegation. (The number of MEP's are below each discipline index)

	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI- EU NA		National delegation
F	92.18	88.2	51.19	97.02	93.78	94.04	96.46	87.18	88.26	76.2
	37	20	12	18	31	8	14	15	14	170
UK	95	93.52	96.2	-	-	-	92.33	72.44	72.16	89.64
	69	39	2	0	0	0	3	1	1	115
I	95.46	93.32	90.44	92.9	82.7	92.82	93.06	-	69.65	80.08
	25	44	6	11	25	12	3	0	17	144
IRL	97.33	95.1	98.15	96.38	89.87	100	-	-	-	83.95
	2	4	2	3	11	2	0	0	0	24
FND	97.36	93.43	92.31	97	-	83.57	-	-	-	78.14
	6	9	10	1	0	4	0	0	0	30
SW	90.47	96.21	87.57	89.17	-	79.81	-	-	-	78.55
	16	7	4	4	0	4	0	0	0	35
D	95.64	97.57	90.08	98.36	-	-	-n.r.**		n.r*	84.18
	53	61	6	17	0	0	0	5	1	143
GR	94.14	96	-	-	87.25	93.52	-	-	-	84.59
	18	16	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	41
NL	97.54	96.37	95.72	98.04	83.22	-	-	76.04	-	82.71
	11	12	11	3	2	0	0	3	0	42
E	95.62	93.87	85.09	84.09	n.r*	95.72	94.43	-	n.r*	83.04
	32	42	6	5	1	11	4	0	1	102
B	94.25	95.63	90.32	99.45	-	-	92.13	-	86.72	79.89
	12	10	10	4	0	0	2	0	3	41
P	95.91	88.81	78.27	n.r*	86.87	94.99	-	-	-	84.09
	20	11	6	1	5	6	0	0	0	49
AST	93.16	93.7	93.99	97.44	-	-	-	-	79.13	79.38
	11	12	2	1	0	0	0	0	12	38
DK	91.12	97.73	94.98	n.r*	-	80.87	-	71.03	-	78.06
	5	6	8	1	0	1	0	4	0	25
L	95.43	96.32	91.53	-	-	-	89.4	-	-	82.12
	3	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	10

n.r*: Member never voted Yes or No on any issue (either mostly absent or abstained).

FIGURE 7a

MEPs' Ideal Points, EP 3 (1989-1994)

Symbols representing MEPs as follows: 'S'= Southern MEPs, 'N'=Northern MEPs, 'x'=UK Members. '.'=other Members

FIGURE 7b.

MEPs' Ideal Points, EP 4 (1994-1999)

Symbols representing MEPs as follows: 'S'= Southern MEPs, 'N'=Northern MEPs, 'x'=UK Members.
'.'=other Members

TABLE 10 Discipline index for votes on cohesion and structural funds(average frequency of vote with party group or country) in bold. Number of deputies present in the votes are below each discipline index

	PES	EPP	ELDR	GR	GAUL	LEFT	RAD	ANTI- EU NA	National delegation
F	91.77 35	87.81 19	81.85 10	100 16	97.47 29	92.55 9	97.95 14	90.37 14	82.2 13
UK	94.67 72	80.41 38	100- 2	- 0	- 0		94.93 3	70.18 1	71.43 1
I	96.7 33	90.78 42	95.32 7	96.45 11	82.59 24	87.71 14	95.5- 3		60.95 16
IRL	95.45 2	88.62 4	95.55 2	86.73 3	91.61 11	96.15- 2	- 0	- 0	
FND	96.28 6	97.47 9	91.67 9	82.05- 1		50.67- 3	- 0	- 0	
SW	92.05 9	92.63 5	82.54 3	70.64- 4		46.13- 3	- 0	- 0	
D	85.28 54	93.9 62	92.5 6	97.11- 17	- 0	- 0		86.06 5	100 1
GR	92.59 21	89.28- 17	- 0		86.48 3	92.7- 5	- 0	- 0	
NL	87.57 12	92.97 12	89.03 11	98.85 3	80- 2	- 0		72.19- 3	
E	95.95 35	84.05 42	95.62 8	76.19 5	100 1	91.34 10	97.5- 4		50 3
B	97.24 12	94.01 10	98.94 9	99.43- 4	- 0		92.5- 2		78.06 3
P	88.79 16	78.67 11	88.24 6	85 1	98.11 4	88.89- 7	- 0	- 0	
AST	79.42 8	94 11	100 2	97.62- 1	- 0	- 0	- 0		83.09 10
DK	98.5 5	95.54 7	96.37 8	0- 1	- 0	- 0		64.4 4	0 1
L	98.15 3	98.67 3	100- 3	- 0	- 0		100- 1	- 0	

n.r*: Member never voted Yes or No on any issue (either mostly absent or abstained).