| Announcements |
| :--- |
| Problem set 3 up later today. |
| Discuss Scores on midterm Monday lecture |
| Start Macro next time. Lots of reading. Stick to <br> required pages.. |
|  |



## Role of Government <br> Enhance Efficiency <br> Enhance Equity <br> Make/ enforce Laws/ Institutions <br> 

WSJ , J une 18, Natural-Gas Prices Rock U.S.'s
Chemical Industry
WSJ , J une 27 Amid Fight Over Teen Drinking,
Panel Weighs New Alcohol Tax

## Role of Government

Efficiency: Increase size of pie, remove DWL
Equity: share pie, redistribute
Laws: collect tax, property rights
Institutions: courts, police, government agencies, etc

## Public Goods

Private Good: Excludable so can charge price and MB \& MC determine $P, Q$

Public Good: Non-rival and non-excludable
public park
public security (street light, airport security) national defense
sanitation/ garbage collection services

| Public Goods |
| :--- |
| Public Good Financing |
| Private: donation |
| contracting (garbage, airport security) |
| Public: tax <br> head <br> proportional <br> progressive/ regressive |

## Public Goods

Tax
head: flat amount
proportional: fixed \% of income progressive: increasing \% of income regressive: decreasing \% of income
eg Head Tax of \$1
Income = 10 (10\%)
Income = 100 (1 \%)
so, regressive

## Public Goods

Lecture 6: example from problem 1 chapter 15
Finance neighborhood security guard
WTP > cost of guard, optimal to have guard
Head tax $\$ 60$ each (regressive)
Fails to get financed since exceeds res price of one resident

Greater chance of financing with prop or prog tax

## Externality

Eg. Pollution

Private: bargain/ negotiation Coase (zero transaction cost, property rights)

Public: tax, standard, auction permit

## Externality

Eg. Private Bargain
Chapter 11, problem 8, Barton \& Statler

|  | Soundproof | Not Soundproof |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gain to B | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 150$ |
| Gain to S | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 80$ |
| Barton has right to Pollution |  |  |
| Statler has right to Pollution-free |  |  |

## Externality

| Gain to B | Soundproof Not Soundproof <br> $\$ 100$ $\$ 150$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gain to S | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 80$ |

$B$ has right to Pollution
$S$ is victim \& considers bribe
has to bribe 50, but gain is only 40
Pollution: $B=150, S=80$, surplus $=230$
$S$ has right to Pollution-free
$B$ is victim \& considers bribe
has to bribe 40 , and gain is 50
Pollution: $B=110, S=120$, surplus $=230$ Doesn't matter who has right.

| $\quad$ Externality |
| :--- |
| Example with no private bargaining, transaction cost |
| high. Firms that pollute \& many victims |
| No Regulation |
| Regulation with standard (not least cost) |
| Regulation with tax (least cost), |
| optimal tax trial \& error |
| Regulation with auction permit (least cost, no info problem) |


| Costs and Emissions for Different Production Processes |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Process (smoke) | $\begin{gathered} \text { A } \\ \text { (4 tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { B } \\ \text { (3 tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{C} \\ \text { (2 tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} D \\ \text { (1 ton/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{E} \\ (0 \text { tons/day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost to Sludge Oil (\$/day) | $100$ | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 2,300 |
| Cost to Northwest Lumber (\$/day) | $300$ | $320$ | $380$ | 480 | 700 |
| Scenario I |  |  |  |  |  |
| No regulation: firm has right to pollute |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 tons each |  |  |  |  |  |


| Costs and Emissions for Different Production Processes <br> What is the least costly way to get 4 Tons Total? |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Process (smoke) | $\begin{gathered} \hline A \\ \text { (4 tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{B} \\ (3 \text { tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{C} \\ (2 \text { tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { D } \\ \text { (1 ton/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{E} \\ (0 \text { tons/day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost to Sludge Oil (\$/day) | $100$ | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 2,300 |
| Cost to Northwest Lumber (\$/day) | $\text { t } \quad 300$ | $320$ | $380$ | 480 | 700 |
| Scenario II |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regulation Standard: 2 Tons each |  |  |  |  |  |
| MC Abatement: $\begin{aligned} & S O=600-100=500 \\ & N L=380-300=80 \end{aligned}$ <br> MC abatement $=580$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Costs and Emissions for Different Production Processes <br> is the least costly way to get 4 Tons Total? |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Process } \\ & \text { (smoke) } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { A } \\ (4 \text { tons/day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { B } \\ \text { (3 tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{C} \\ \text { (2 tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { D } \\ \text { (1 ton/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{E} \\ (0 \text { tons/day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost to Sludge Oil (\$/day) | 100 | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 2,300 |
| Cost to Northwest | 300 | 320 | 380 | 480 | 700 |
| Lumber (\$/day) | Scenario III |  |  |  |  |
| Regulation Tax: 40/ton tax (By Trial \& Error) <br> MB Abatement $=40$ per ton <br> MC Abatement = additional cost of cleaner technology |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\cdot$ SO uses $A(40<100)$ <br> $\cdot$ NL uses $B \quad(40>20) \quad$ Pollution $=7$ tons |  |  |  |  |  |


| Costs and Emissions for Different Production Processes <br> is the least costly way to get 4 Tons Total? |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Process (smoke) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { A } \\ \text { (4 tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{B} \\ (3 \text { tons/day) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{C} \\ \text { (2 tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline D \\ (1 \text { ton } / \text { day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} E \\ (0 \text { tons/day }) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost to Sludge Oil (\$/day) | $100$ | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 2,300 |
| Cost to Northwest Lumber (\$/day) | $300$ | $320$ | 380 | 480 | 700 |
| Scenario IV MC Abatement 280 |  |  |  |  |  |
| SO uses $B(101>100)$ <br> NL uses D (101 > 20, 60, 100) |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & S O=10 \\ & N L=18 \\ & \text { Least } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |


| Costs and Emissions for Different Production Processes <br> How much will pollution permits sell for? |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Process } \\ & \text { (smoke) } \end{aligned}$ | A (4 tons $/$ day) | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{B} \\ \text { (3 tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{C} \\ \text { (2 tons/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { D } \\ \text { (1 ton/day) } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} E \\ (0 \text { tons/day }) \end{gathered}$ |
| Cost to Sludge Oil (\$/day) | $100$ | 200 | 600 | 1,300 | 2,300 |
| Cost to Northwest Lumber (\$/day) | $300$ | $320$ | $380$ | $480$ | 700 |
| - Government set the opening bid at $\$ 90$ <br> -SO buys 4 permits NL buys 2 permits, 6 permits <br> - Government will raise the price until quantity demanded $=4$ permits, raise price to $\$ 101$ <br> -SO buys $\mathbf{3}$ (B) , NL buys 1 (D), MC Abatement $=\mathbf{2 8 0}$ |  |  |  |  |  |


| Natural Monoply |
| :--- |
| Monopoly due to economies of scale |
| Everywhere declining AC (so MC < AC) |
| Cheaper for 1 firm to produce many units |
| One firm is monopoly (monopoly DWL) |


| Natural Monoply |
| :---: |
| Regulate: force to produce more |
| force to sell at below monopoly price |
| Problem: what firm is a natural monopoly |
| public utility (ok) |
| railroad (ok), trucking (no) |

## Externality

Example with no private bargaining, transaction cost high. Firms that pollute \& many victims

No Regulation 8 tons
Regulation with standard 2 ton each $\mathrm{MC}=580$
Regulation with $\operatorname{tax}=\$ 101, \mathrm{MC}=280$
Regulation with auction permit MC=280

Economies of Scale: Declining ATC, ATC > MC

(Special Form of TC)


## Natural Monoply

Regulate:
Set price $=A C$
problem that firm inflates cost
Incentive Regulation
Govt sets regulated price for several years \& share profit/ loss with consumer
if costs low, firm keeps profit \& shares if costs high, firm absorbs losses \& shares

| Redistribution |
| :---: |
| Distribution of Income |
| according to Rawls |
| veil of ignorance |
| ideal =tend to equality |
| Distribution of Wealth |
| according to Bill Gates Sr |
| wealthy got wealthy by relying on |
| govt institutions \& infrastructure |
| ideal=reduce inequality |

## Redistribution

Policies that aim to equalize incomes:

## Minimum wage

Means Tested Transfer Programs
AFDC, Personal Responsibility Act Medicaid

Other Means Tested Programs EITC (tax credit for low income)

## Production and Consumption

 Possibilities and the Benefits of Trade- A country's PPC shows the quantities of different goods that its economy can produce.
- Consumption Possibilities
- The combinations of goods and services that a country's citizens might feasibly consume

| Production and Consumption <br> Possibilities and the Benefits of Trade <br> - A country's PPC shows the quantities of <br> different goods that its economy can <br> produce. <br> - Consumption Possibilities <br> - The combinations of goods and services <br> that a country's citizens might feasibly <br> consume <br>  |
| :--- |


| Redistribution |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Distribution of Income |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| bot 20\% | 1960 | 2001 |
| next 20\% | 4.3 | 4.3 |
| next 20\% | 12.2 | 9.9 |
| next 20\% | 17.8 | 15.6 |
| top 20\% | 24.0 | 23.0 |
| top 5\% | 41.3 | 47.2 (almost half) |
|  | 15.9 | $20.7^{*}$ |

## Summary: Government Role

Government enhances efficiency and equity and makes \& enforces laws.

Whether government should have role should follow cost-benefit criterion, ultimately

## Production and Consumption Possibilities and the Benefits of Trade

- In an open economy:
- The society's consumption possibilities are typically greater than its production possibilities.


## Brazil's Consumption Possibilities with Trade





## Production and Consumption Possibilities and the Benefits of Trade

- Economic Naturalist
- Scenario
U.S. and Fredonia produce software and beef.
-Real wages in Fredonia are lower than in the U.S.
- Fredonia is half as productive as the U.S. in beef production.
- Fredonia is one-tenth as productive in software production.

Production and Consumption Possibilities and the Benefits of Trade

- Economic Naturalist
- Outcome
- Fredonia has a comparative advantage in beef.
$\bullet$ U.S. has a comparative advantage in software.
-The U.S. will trade software for beef and increase its consumption of both.
- Employment in the software industry in the U.S. increases and employment in the beef industry will decrease.



## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- If the price of a good or service in a closed economy is greater than the world price, and that economy opens itself to trade, the economy will tend to become a net importer of that good or service.


## The Market for Coffee in Brazil



ES

## The Market for Computers in Brazil



ED


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- If the price of a good or service in a closed economy is lower than the world price, and that economy opens itself for trade, the economy will tend to become a net exporter of that good or service.


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Observations of the Mutually Beneficial Gains from Trade
- The markets will ensure that goods will be produced where opportunity cost is lowest.
- The consumption possibilities will be maximized.


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Observations of the Mutually Beneficial Gains from Trade
- Countries will profit by exporting the goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage.
- The revenue from the exports are used to import goods and services for which they do not have a comparative advantage.


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Winners and Losers from Trade
- Winners
- Consumers of imported goods
- Producers of exported goods
- Losers
- Consumers of exported goods
- Producers of imported goods


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Protectionism
- The view that free trade is injurious and should be restricted
- Tariff
- A tax imposed on an imported good
- Quota
- A legal limit on the quantity of a good that may be imported

The Market for Computers after the Imposition of an Import Tariff


The Market for Computers after the Imposition of an Import Tariff


- Tariffs
- Closed economy
- Equilibrium price:
o $1,000+0.5 P_{C}=3,000-0.5 P_{C}$ o $P_{C}=\$ 2,000$
- Equilibrium quantity:
o $1,000+0.5(2,000)=2,000$ computers


## A Supply and Demand <br> Perspective on Trade

## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Tariffs
- The market for computers in Brazil:
- Demand $=Q^{D}=3,000-0.5 P_{C}$
- Supply $=Q^{S}=1,000+0.5 P_{C}$


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Tariffs
- Open economy
- $P=$ world price $=\$ 1,500$
- $q_{S}=1,000+0.5(1,500)=1,750$
$-q_{D}=3,000-0.5(1,500)=2,250$
- Imports $=2,250-1,750=500$ computers/yr


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Tariffs
- Tariff imposed
- Tariff $=\$ 300 /$ computer
- $P=$ world price + tariff $=\$ 1,500+\$ 300=\$ 1,800$
- $q_{s}=1,000+(0.5)(1,800)=1,900$ computers $/ \mathrm{yr}$
- $q_{d}=3,000=(0.5)(1,800)=2,100$
- Imports = 2,100-1,900 = 200
- Tariff revenue $=\$ 300 /$ computer $\times 200$ computers/yr = \$60,000/yr

The Market for Computers after the Imposition of an Import Quota



## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Effects of an import Quota
- Without quota:
$-q_{S}=1,000+0.5 P_{C}$
- With a quota of 200 computers
$-q_{S}=1,000+0.5 P_{C}+200=1,200+0.5 P_{C}$
$-q_{D}=3,000-0.5 P_{C}$
- Equilibrium $=1,200+0.5 P_{C}=3,000-0.5 P_{C}$
- Equilibrium price $=\$ 1,800$


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Other Barriers to Trade
- Red-tape barriers
- Regulations


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Quotas \& Tariffs
- Market effects of tariffs are the same.
- Tariffs generate tax revenue.
- Quotas generate revenue for the firms that hold an import license. Or (rents), if they bribe officials to get the license (eg in LDCs)


## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- Effects of an import Quota
- With a quota of 200 computers
- Domestic quantity supplied - $1,000+0.5(\$ 1,800)=1,900$ computers $/ \mathrm{yr}$
- Domestic quantity demanded o 3,000-0.5 (\$1,800) = 2,100 computers/yr
- Imports $=2,100-1,900=200$
- Revenue to the importers

○ $(\$ 1,800-\$ 1,500) \times 200=\$ 60,000$

## A Supply and Demand Perspective on Trade

- The Inefficiency of Protectionism
- Trade barriers are inefficient and reduce the size of the economic pie.
- Because trade barriers benefit certain groups, and these groups may be well organized, they may be successful in lobbying for trade barriers.
- The gains from trade could be used to assist groups that have been hurt by trade.

