Economics 101A (Lecture 25)

Stefano DellaVigna

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Outline

- 1. Example of General Equilibrium
- 2. Existence and Welfare Theorems
- 3. Asymmetric Information: Introduction
- 4. Hidden Action (Moral Hazard)

1 Example

• Consumer 1 has Leontieff preferences:

$$u(x_{1,}x_{2}) = \min\left(x_{1}^{1}, x_{2}^{1}\right)$$

• Bundle demanded by consumer 1:

$$x_1^{1*} = x_2^{1*} = x^{1*} = \frac{p_1 \omega_1^1 + p_2 \omega_2^1}{p_1 + p_2} = \frac{\omega_1^1 + (p_2/p_1) \omega_2^1}{1 + (p_2/p_1)}$$

• Graphically

- Comparative statics:
 - increase in ω
 - increase in p_2/p_1 :

$$\frac{dx_1^{1*}}{dp_2/p_1} = \frac{-\left(\omega_1^1 + (p_2/p_1)\right)}{\left(1 + (p_2/p_1)\omega_2^1\right)} = \frac{\omega_2^1 - \omega_1^1}{\left(1 + (p_2/p_1)\right)^2} =$$

- Effect depends on income effect through endowments:
 - * A lot of good 2 -> increase in price of good
 2 makes richer
 - Little good 2 -> increase in price of good 2 makes poorer
- Notice: Only ratio of prices matters (general feature)

• Consumer 2 has Cobb-Douglas preferences:

$$u(x_{1,x_{2}}) = (x_{1}^{2})^{.5} (x_{2}^{2})^{.5}$$

• Demands of consumer 2:

$$x_1^{2*} = \frac{.5\left(p_1\omega_1^1 + p_2\omega_2^1\right)}{p_1} = .5\left(\omega_1^1 + \frac{p_2}{p_1}\omega_2^1\right)$$

 $\quad \text{and} \quad$

$$x_2^{2*} = \frac{.5\left(p_1\omega_1^1 + p_2\omega_2^1\right)}{p_2} = .5\left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\omega_1^1 + \omega_2^1\right)$$

- Comparative statics:
 - increase in ω –> Increase in final consumption
 - increase in p_2/p_1 –> Unambiguous increase in $x_1^{2\ast}$ and decrease in $x_2^{2\ast}$

• Impose Walrasian equilibrium in market 1:

$$x_1^{1*} + x_1^{2*} = \omega_1^1 + \omega_1^2$$

This implies

$$\frac{\omega_1^1 + (p_2/p_1)\omega_2^1}{1 + (p_2/p_1)} + .5\left(\omega_1^1 + \frac{p_2}{p_1}\omega_2^1\right) = \omega_1^1 + \omega_1^2$$

or

$$\frac{.5 - .5 \left(p_2/p_1\right)}{1 + \left(p_2/p_1\right)} \omega_1^1 + \frac{.5 \left(p_2/p_1\right) + .5 \left(p_2/p_1\right)^2 - 1}{1 + \left(p_2/p_1\right)} \omega_2^1 = 0$$
 or

$$(\omega_1^1 - 2\omega_2^1) + (\omega_1^1 + \omega_2^1) (p_2/p_1) + \omega_2^1 (p_2/p_1)^2 = 0$$

• Solution for p_2/p_1 :

$$\frac{p_2}{p_1} = \frac{-\left(\omega_1^1 - 2\omega_2^1\right) + \sqrt{\begin{array}{c} \left(\omega_1^1 + \omega_2^1\right)^2 \\ -4\left(\omega_1^1 - 2\omega_2^1\right)\omega_2^1 \\ 2\left(\omega_1^1 - 2\omega_2^1\right) \end{array}}$$

• Some complicated solution!

• Problem set has solution that is easier to compute (and interpret)

2 Existence and Welfare Theorems

• Does Walrasian Equilibrium always exist? In general, yes, as long as preference convex


• Is Walrasian Equilibrium always unique? Not necessarily

• Is Walrasian Equilibrium efficient? Yes.

• First Fundamental Welfare Theorem. All Walrasian Equilibria are on Contract Curve (and therefore are Pareto Efficient).

• Figure

• Second Fundamental Welfare theorem. Given convex preferences, for every Pareto efficient allocation $((x_1^1, x_1^1), (x_1^2, x_2^2))$ there exists some endowment (ω_1, ω_2) such that $((x_1^1, x_1^1), (x_1^2, x_2^2))$ is a Walrasian Equilibrium for endowment (ω_1, ω_2) .



- Significance of these results:
 - First Theorem: Smithian Invisible Hand. Market leads to an allocation that is Pareto Efficient.
 - BUT: problems with externalities and public good
 - BUT: what about distribution?

- Second Theorem: Can redistribute endowments to achieve any efficient outcome as a WE.
- But redistribution is hard to implement, and distortive.

3 Asymmetric Information: Introduction

- Nicholson, Ch. 18, pp. 627-632 [*NOT* in 9th Ed.]
- Common economic relationship
- Contract between two parties:
 - Principal
 - Agent
- Two parties have asymmetric information
 - Principal offers a contract to the agent
 - Agent chooses an action
 - Action of agent (or his type) is not observed by principle

- Example 1: Manager and worker
 - Manager employs worker and offers wage
 - Worker exerts effort (not observed)
 - Manager pays worker as function of output
- Example 2: Car Insurance
 - Car insurance company offers insurance contract
 - Driver chooses quality of driving (not observed)
 - Insurance company pays for accidents
- Example 3: Shareholders and CEO
 - Shareholders choose compensation for CEO
 - CEO puts effort
 - CEO paid as function of stock price

- In all of these cases (and many more!), common structure
 - Principal would like to observe effort (of worker, of CEO, of driver)
 - Unfortunately, this is not observable
 - Only a related, noisy proxy is observable: output, accident, success
 - Contract offered by principal is function of this proxy
- This means that occasionally an agent that put a lot of effort but has bad luck is 'punished'
- Also, agents that shirked may instead be compensated
- These principle-agent problems are called *hidden action* or *moral hazard*

- Second category (next lecture): *hidden type* or *adverse selection*
- Example 1: Manager and worker
 - Manager employs worker and offers wage
 - Worker can be hard-working or lazy
- Example 2: Car Insurance
 - Car insurance company offers insurance contract
 - Drivers ex ante can be careful or careless
- Example 3: Shareholders and CEO
 - Shareholders choose compensation for CEO
 - CEO is high-quality or thief

- Problem is similar (action is not observed), but with a twist
 - Hidden action: principal can convince agent to exert high effort with the appropriate incentives
 - Hidden type: agent's behavior is not affected by incentives, but by her type
- Different task for principal:
 - Hidden action: Principal wants to incentivize agent to work hard
 - Hidden type: Principal wants to make sure to recruit 'good' agent, not 'bad' one
- Two look similar, but analysis is different
- Start from *Hidden Action*

4 Hidden Action (Moral Hazard)

- Nicholson, Ch. 18, pp. 632-637 [NOT in 9th Ed.]
- Example 3: Shareholders and CEO
 - Division of ownership and control
- Shareholders (owners of firm):
 - Have capital, but do not have time to run company themselves
 - Want firm run so as to maximize profits
- CEO (manager)
 - Has time and managerial skill
 - Does not have capital to own the firm

- If CEO owns the company (private enterprises), problem is solved -> Infeasible in large companies
- Agent chooses effort *e* (unobserved)
 - Induces output $y = e + \varepsilon$, where ε is a noise term, with $E(\varepsilon) = 0$
 - Example: Despite putting effort, investment project did not succeed
- $\bullet\,$ Principal pays a salary w to the agent
 - Salary is a function of output y: w = w(y)
 - Remember: Salary cannot be function of effort e

• Principal maximizes expected profits

$$E[\pi] = E[y - w(y)] = e - E[w(y)]$$

Agent is risk averse and maximizes

$$E\left[U\left(w\left(e+\varepsilon\right)\right)\right]-c\left(e\right)$$

- c(e) is cost of effort: assume c'(e) > 0 and c''(e) > 0 for all e
- Utility function U satisfies $U'>{\rm 0}$ and $U''<{\rm 0}$
- Notice: Agent is risk-averse, Principal is riskneutral
- Assume $U(w) = -e^{-\gamma w}$ and $\varepsilon \sim N(\mathbf{0}, \sigma^2)$
- Can solve explicitly for EU(w):

$$EU(w) = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\int e^{-\gamma w}e^{-\frac{1}{2}\frac{w-\mu_w}{\sigma_w^2}}dw = \mu_w -\frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma_w^2$$

[Take this for granted]

- Expected utility of agent is $EU(w) = \mu_w \frac{\gamma}{2}\sigma_w^2$
- Note: μ_w is average salary and σ_w^2 is variance of salary
 - Agent likes high mean salary μ_w
 - Agent dislikes variance in salary σ_w^2
 - Dislike for variance increses in risk aversion γ
- Assume that contract is linear: $w = a + by = a + be + b\varepsilon$
 - Compute $\mu_w = E(w) = E[a + be + b\varepsilon] = a + be + bE[\varepsilon] = a + be$
 - Compute $\sigma_w^2 = Var \left[a + be + b\varepsilon \right] = b^2 \sigma^2$
- Rewrite expected utility as

$$EU(w) = a + be - \frac{\gamma}{2}b^2\sigma^2$$

- Back to Principal-Agent problem
- Solve problem in three Steps, starting from last stage (backward induction)
 - Step 1 (Effort Decision). Given contract w(y), what effort e^* is agent going to put in?
 - Step 2. (Individual Rationality) Given contract w(y) and anticipating to put in effort e^* , does agent accept the contract?
 - Step 3. (Profit Maximization) Anticipating that the effort of the agent e^* (and the acceptance of the contract) will depend on the contract, what contract w(y) does principal choose to maximize profits?

• Step 1. Solve effort maximization of agent:

$$Max_ea + be - \frac{\gamma}{2}b^2\sigma^2 - c(e)$$

• Solution:

$$c'(e) = b$$

- If assume $c(e) = ce^2/2 -> e^* = b/c$
- Check comparative statics
 - With respect to b –> What happens with more pay-for-performance?
 - With respect to c –> What happens with higher cost of effort?

- Step 2. Agent needs to be willing to work for principal
- Individual rationality condition:

$$EU(w(e^*)) - c(e^*) \ge 0$$

• Substitute in the solution for e^{\ast} and obtain

$$a + be^* - \frac{\gamma}{2}b^2\sigma^2 - c(e^*) \ge 0$$

• Will be satisfied with equality: $a^* = -be^* + \frac{\gamma}{2}b^2\sigma^2 + c(e^*)$

• Step 3: Owner maximizes expected profits

$$\max_{a,b} E[\pi] = e - E[w(y)] = e - a - be$$

• Substitute in the two constraints: c'(e) = b (Step 1) and $a^* = -be^* + \frac{\gamma}{2}b^2\sigma^2 + c(e^*)$ (Step 2)

• Obtain

$$E[\pi] = e - \left(-be + \frac{\gamma}{2}b^{2}\sigma^{2} + c(e)\right) - c'(e)e$$

= $e + be - \frac{\gamma}{2}b^{2}\sigma^{2} - c(e^{*}) - c'(e)e$
= $e + c'(e)e - \frac{\gamma}{2}(c'(e))^{2}\sigma^{2} - c(e^{*}) - c'(e)e$
= $e - \frac{\gamma}{2}(c'(e))^{2}\sigma^{2} - c(e^{*})$

• Profit maximization yields f.o.c.

$$1 - \gamma c'(e) \sigma^2 c''(e) - c'(e) = 0$$

and hence

$$c'(e^*) = \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \sigma^2 c''(e^*)}$$

- Notice: This implies $c'(e^*) < 1$
- Substitute $c(e) = ce^2/2$ to get $e^* = \frac{1}{c} \frac{1}{1 + \gamma \sigma^2 c}$
- Comparative Statics:
 - Higher risk aversion γ –>...
 - Higher variance of output σ –>...
 - Higher effort cost c –>...

• Also, remember $b^* = c'(e^*) = ce^*$ and hence

$$b^* = ce^* = c\frac{1}{c}\frac{1}{1+\gamma\sigma^2 c} = \frac{1}{1+\gamma\sigma^2 c}$$

- Notice **0** < *b*^{*} < **1**:
 - Agent gets paid increasing function of output to incentivize
 - Does not get paid one-on-one (b = 1) because that would pass on too much risk to agent
 - (Remember $w^* = a^* + b^*y = a^* + b^*e + b^*\varepsilon$)
 - Comparative Statics: what happens to b^* if $\gamma =$ 0 or $\sigma =$ 0? Interpret

- Compare this solution to solution when effort is observable
- This is so-called **first best** since it eliminates the uncertainty involved in connecting pay to performance (as opposed to effort)
 - Principal offers a flat wage $w\,=\,a$ as long as agent works e^*
 - Agent accepts job if

$$a - c(e^*) \ge 0$$

- Principal wants to pay minimal necessary and hence sets $a^* = c(e^*)$
- Substitute into profit of principal

 $\max_{a,b} E[\pi] = e - E[w(y)] = e - a^* = e - c(e)$

– Solution for
$$e^*$$
: $c'(e^*) = 1$ or $e^*_{FB} = 1/c$

- Compare e^{\ast} above and e^{\ast}_{FB} in first best
- -> With observable effort (first best) agent works harder

• Summary of hidden-action solution with risk-averse agent:

• Risk-incentive trade-off:

- Agent needs to be incentivized $(b^* > 0)$ or will not put in effort e
- Cannot give too much incentive (b^* too high) because of risk-aversion
- Trade-off solved if
 - * Action e observable OR
 - * No risk aversion ($\gamma = 0$) OR
 - * No noise in outcome ($\sigma^2 = 0$)
- Otherwise, effort e^* in equilibrium is sub-optimal
- Same trade-off applies to other cases

- Example 2: *Insurance* (Not fully solved)
 - Two states of the world: Loss and No Loss
 - Probability of Loss is $\pi(e)$, with $\pi'(e) < 0$
 - * Example: Careful driving (Car Insurance)
 - Example: Maintaining your house better (House insurance)
 - * Agent chooses quantity of insurance α purchased
 - Agent risk averse: U(c) with U' > 0 and U'' < 0

- Qualitative solution:
 - No hidden action –> Full insurance: $\alpha^* = L$
 - Hidden action ->
 - * Trade-off risk-incentives –> Only Partial insurance 0 $< \alpha^* < L$
 - * Need to make agent partially responsible for accident to incentivize
 - * Do not want to make too responsible because of risk-aversion

5 Next lecture

- Asymmetric Information
- Moral Hazard