

# Economics 101A

## (Lecture 11)

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## Outline

1. Application 2: Intertemporal choice II
2. Application 3: Altruism and charitable donations
3. Introduction to probability
4. Expected Utility

# 1 Intertemporal choice II

- Nicholson Ch. 17, pp. 597-601 (502–506, 9th)
- Comparative statics with respect to income  $M_0$
- Rewrite ratio of f.o.c.s as

$$U'(c_0) - \frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U'(c_1) = 0$$

- Substitute  $c_1$  in using  $c_1 = M_1 + (M_0 - c_0)(1+r)$  to get

$$U'(c_0) - \frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U'(M_1 + (M_0 - c_0)(1+r)) = 0$$

- Apply implicit function theorem:

$$\frac{\partial c_0^*(r, \mathbf{M})}{\partial M_0} = -\frac{-\frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U''(c_1)(1+r)}{U''(c_0) - \frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U''(c_1) * (-(1+r))}$$

- Denominator is always negative
- Numerator is positive
- $\partial c_0^*(r, \mathbf{M}) / \partial M_0 > 0$  — consumption at time 0 is a normal good.
- Can also show  $\partial c_0^*(r, \mathbf{M}) / \partial M_1 > 0$

- Comparative statics with respect to interest rate  $r$
- Apply implicit function theorem:

$$\frac{\partial c_0^*(r, \mathbf{M})}{\partial r} = \frac{-\frac{1}{1+\delta}U'(c_1)}{U''(c_0) - \frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U''(c_1) * (-(1+r))} \\ \frac{-\frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U''(c_1) * (M_0 - c_0)}{U''(c_0) - \frac{1+r}{1+\delta}U''(c_1) * (-(1+r))}$$

- Denominator is always negative
- Numerator: First term negative (substitution eff.)
- Numerator: Second term (income effect:)
  - positive if  $M_0 > c_0$
  - negative if  $M_0 < c_0$ .

## 2 Altruism and Charitable Donations

- Maximize utility = satisfy self-interest?
- No, not necessarily
- 2-person economy:
  - Mark has income  $M_M$  and consumes  $c_M$
  - Wendy has income  $M_W$  and consumes  $c_W$
- One good:  $c$ , with price  $p = 1$

- Utility function:  $u(c)$ , with  $u' > 0$ ,  $u'' < 0$
- Wendy is altruistic: she maximizes  $u(c_W) + \alpha u(c_M)$  with  $\alpha > 0$
- Mark simply maximizes  $u(c_M)$
- Wendy can give a donation of income  $D$  to Mark.



- Wendy computes the utility of Mark as a function of the donation  $D$

- Mark maximizes

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_M} u(c_M) \\ \text{s.t. } c_M \leq M_M + D \end{aligned}$$

- Solution:  $c_M^* = M_M + D$

- Wendy maximizes

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_M, D} u(c_W) + \alpha u(M_M + D) \\ \text{s.t. } c_W \leq M_W - D \end{aligned}$$

- Rewrite as:

$$\max_D u(M_W - D) + \alpha u(M_M + D)$$

- First order condition:

$$-u'(M_W - D^*) + \alpha u'(M_M + D^*) = 0$$

- Second order conditions:

$$u''(M_W - D^*) + \alpha u''(M_M + D^*) < 0$$

- Assume  $\alpha = 1$ .

- Solution?

- $u'(M_W - D) = u'(M_M + D^*)$

- $M_W - D^* = M_M + D^*$  or  $D^* = (M_W - M_M) / 2$

- Transfer money so as to equate incomes!

- Careful:  $D < 0$  (negative donation!) if  $M_M > M_W$

- Corrected maximization:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_D & u(M_W - D) + \alpha u(M_M + D) \\ \text{s.t. } & D \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

- Solution ( $\alpha = 1$ ):

$$D^* = \begin{cases} (M_W - M_M) / 2 & \text{if } M_W - M_M > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Assume interior solution. ( $D^* > 0$ )

- Comparative statics 1 (altruism):

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \alpha} = -\frac{u'(M_M + D^*)}{u''(M_W - D^*) + \alpha u''(M_M + D^*)} > 0$$

- Comparative statics 2 (income of donor):

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial M_W} = -\frac{-u''(M_W + D^*)}{u''(M_W - D^*) + \alpha u''(M_M + D^*)} > 0$$

- Comparative statics 3 (income of recipient ):

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial M_M} = -\frac{\alpha u''(M_M + D^*)}{u''(M_W - D^*) + \alpha u''(M_M + D^*)} < 0$$

- A quick look at the evidence
- From Andreoni (2002)

### 3 Introduction to Probability

- So far deterministic world:
  - income given, known  $M$
  - interest rate known  $r$
- But some variables are unknown at time of decision:
  - future income  $M_1$ ?
  - future interest rate  $r_1$ ?
- Generalize framework to allow for uncertainty
  - Events that are truly unpredictable (weather)
  - Event that are very hard to predict (future income)

- Probability is the language of uncertainty
- Example:
  - Income  $M_1$  at  $t = 1$  depends on state of the economy
  - Recession ( $M_1 = 20$ ), Slow growth ( $M_2 = 25$ ), Boom ( $M_3 = 30$ )
  - Three probabilities:  $p_1, p_2, p_3$
  - $p_1 = P(M_1) = P(\text{recession})$
- Properties:
  - $0 \leq p_i \leq 1$
  - $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$

- Mean income:  $EM = \sum_{i=1}^3 p_i M_i$

- If  $(p_1, p_2, p_3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$ ,

$$EM = \frac{1}{3}20 + \frac{1}{3}25 + \frac{1}{3}30 = \frac{75}{3} = 25$$

- Variance of income:  $V(M) = \sum_{i=1}^3 p_i (M_i - EM)^2$

- If  $(p_1, p_2, p_3) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} V(M) &= \frac{1}{3}(20 - 25)^2 + \frac{1}{3}(25 - 25)^2 + \frac{1}{3}(30 - 25)^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{3}5^2 + \frac{1}{3}5^2 = 2/3 * 25 \end{aligned}$$

- Mean and variance if  $(p_1, p_2, p_3) = (1/4, 1/2, 1/4)$ ?



## 4 Expected Utility

- Nicholson, Ch. 7, pp. 202-209 (Ch. 18, pp. 533–541, 9th)
- Consumer at time 0 asks: what is utility in time 1?
- At  $t = 1$  consumer maximizes

$$\begin{aligned} \max U(c^1) \\ \text{s.t. } c_i^1 \leq M_i^1 + (1+r)(M^0 - c^0) \end{aligned}$$

with  $i = 1, 2, 3$ .

- What is utility at optimum at  $t = 1$  if  $U' > 0$ ?
- Assume for now  $M^0 - c^0 = 0$
- Utility  $U(M_i^1)$
- This is uncertain, depends on which  $i$  is realized!

- How do we evaluate future uncertain utility?

- **Expected utility**

$$EU = \sum_{i=1}^3 p_i U(M_i^1)$$

- In example:

$$EU = 1/3U(20) + 1/3U(25) + 1/3U(30)$$

- Compare with  $U(EC) = U(25)$ .

- Agents prefer riskless outcome  $EM$  to uncertain outcome  $M$  if

$$\begin{aligned} 1/3U(20) + 1/3U(25) + 1/3U(30) &< U(25) \text{ or} \\ 1/3U(20) + 1/3U(30) &< 2/3U(25) \text{ or} \\ 1/2U(20) + 1/2U(30) &< U(25) \end{aligned}$$

- Picture

- Depends on sign of  $U''$ , on concavity/convexity

- Three cases:

- $U''(x) = 0$  for all  $x$ . (linearity of  $U$ )

- \*  $U(x) = a + bx$

- \*  $1/2U(20) + 1/2U(30) = U(25)$

- $U''(x) < 0$  for all  $x$ . (concavity of  $U$ )

- \*  $1/2U(20) + 1/2U(30) < U(25)$

- $U''(x) > 0$  for all  $x$ . (convexity of  $U$ )

- \*  $1/2U(20) + 1/2U(30) > U(25)$

- If  $U''(x) = 0$  (linearity), consumer is indifferent to uncertainty
- If  $U''(x) < 0$  (concavity), consumer dislikes uncertainty
- If  $U''(x) > 0$  (convexity), consumer likes uncertainty
- Do consumers like uncertainty?
- Do *you* like uncertainty?

- **Theorem. (Jensen's inequality)** If a function  $f(x)$  is concave, the following inequality holds:

$$f(Ex) \geq Ef(x)$$

where  $E$  indicates expectation. If  $f$  is strictly concave, we obtain

$$f(Ex) > Ef(x)$$

- Apply to utility function  $U$ .

- Individuals dislike uncertainty:

$$U(Ex) \geq EU(x)$$

- Jensen's inequality then implies  $U$  concave ( $U'' \leq 0$ )

- Relate to diminishing marginal utility of income

# 5 Next Lectures

- Risk aversion
- Applications:
  - Insurance
  - Portfolio choice
  - Consumption choice II