Econ 219B Psychology and Economics: Applications (Lecture 1)

Stefano DellaVigna

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Outline

- 1. Introduction / Prerequisites
- 2. Getting started!Psychology and Economics: The Topics
- 3. Psychology and Economics: Empirical Methods
- 4. Methodology: Reading the Psychology Journals
- 5. Psychology and Economics by Field
- 6. Defaults and 401(k)s: The Facts

1 Who am I?

Stefano DellaVigna

- Associate Professor, Department of Economics
- Bocconi (Italy) undergraduate (Econ.), Harvard PhD (Econ.)
- Psych and Econ, Applied Microeconomics, Media Economics, Political Economy, Behavioral Finance,
- Evans 515 OH schedule by email

2 Who are you?

- PhD student 2nd year and higher. Graduate courses in
 - Econometrics
 - Micro Theory (Contract Theory, Game Theory)
 - Psychology and Economics Theory (219A)
- Interest in
 - Psychology and Economics
 - Applied, empirical microeconomics (io, labor, public finance, finance)

3 What is this class?

- Reading list:
 - complete, updated list on course webpage
 - 'Textbook': "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field"
 (Journal of Economic Literature 2009)
 - 11 Methodological Topics
 - Please email me (sdellavi@econ.berkeley.edu) for any issue with class and to schedule a meeting

• Grade:

- 3 or 4 problem sets on models and empirics (30% weight)
- Final exam (40% weight)
- Your choice of:
 - * 10-15 page paper that uses field evidence (30% weight)
 - * An empirical problem set (30% weight)
- I encourage you to try to write a paper

- Deadlines for paper
 - Meet with me about your paper by 3/2
 - Brief summary of your research idea by 4/6 (2 pages, research question, data availability)
 - Paper due on 5/10
- Information Sheet

4 Psychology and Economics: The Topics

 Prototypical economist conception of human behavior (Rabin, 2002a):

$$\max_{x_i^t \in X_i} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \sum_{s_t \in S_t} p(s_t) U(x_i^t | s_t).$$

- ullet X_i is set of "life-time strategies", S_t is set of state spaces
- $p(s_t)$ are rational beliefs, $\delta \in (0,1)$ is time-consistent discount factor
- $u(\cdot, s, t)$ is true utility at time t in state s

• Improving Psychological Realism

• Step 1. Non-Standard Preferences

1. Present-Biased Preferences: time inconsistency (β, δ)

2. Reference Dependence: $U\left(x_i|r,s\right)$ with r reference point

3. Social Preferences: $U(x_i, x_{-i}|s)$ where x_{-i} is allocation of others

• Example 1. Reference Dependence – Sydnor (AEJ: Applied, forthcoming)

• Sydnor studies deductible choice in home insurance policies

• Menu: \$250, \$500, \$1,000. Higher deductible -> Lower premium

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
| Chosen Deductible | Number of claims per policy | Increase in out-of-pocket payments <i>per claim</i> with a \$1000 deductible | Increase in out-of-pocket payments <i>per policy</i> with a \$1000 deductible | Reduction in yearly premium per policy with \$1000 deductible | Savings per policy with \$1000 deductible | | | |
|--|-----------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| \$500 | 0.043 | 469.86 | 19.93 | 99.85 | 79.93 | | | |
| N=23,782 (47.6%) | (.0014) | (2.91) | (0.67) | (0.26) | (0.71) | | | |
| \$250 | 0.049 | 651.61 (6.59) | 31.98 | 158.93 | 126.95 | | | |
| N=17,536 (35.1%) | (.0018) | | (1.20) | (0.45) | (1.28) | | | |
| Average forgone expected savings for all low-deductible customers: \$99.88 | | | | | | | | |

• Example 2. Social Preferences – Gneezy and List (EMA, 2006)

• Recruit workers to enter manually data on books for 6 hours for \$12/hour

• Treatment (gift) group: After hiring, told pay increased to \$20/hour

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• Step 2. Non-Standard Beliefs: beliefs $\tilde{p}(s) \neq p(s)$

1. Overconfidence: wrong E(p) or wrong Var(p)

2. Law of Small Numbers: Wrong forecast of $p(s_{t+1}|s_t)$

3. Projection Bias: wrong forecast of utility: $\hat{u}(\cdot, s)$

• Example 3 – Conlin, O'Donoghue and Vogelsang (AER, 2007)

• Examine mail orders of cold-weather apparel

• Relate temperature on order date to *return* probability

• Standard model: No relation or positive relation (the colder it is now, the more you will need it in 5 days)

- Example 3 Conlin, O'Donoghue and Vogelsang (AER, 2007)
- Examine mail orders of cold-weather apparel
- Relate temperature on order date to *return* probability
- Standard model: No relation or positive relation (the colder it is now, the more you will need it in 5 days)

TABLE 2
Probit Regression Measuring the Effect of Temperature on the Probability Cold Weather Clothing is Returned
Dependent Variable is Whether Item is Returned (=1 if item returned and 0 otherwise)

| | Gloves & | Winter | Hats | Sports | Parkas & | Vests | Jackets |
|-----------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| | Mittens | Boots | | Equipment | Coats | | |
| Temperature on Day Item was Order | -0.00014** | -0.00021** | -0.00017** | -0.00009 | -0.00007 | -0.00043** | -0.00019 |
| | (0.00005) | (0.00008) | (0.00005) | (0.00007) | (0.00007) | (0.00010) | (0.00013) |
| I . | | | | l I | | | |

• Correlation consistent with projection bias

• Current state s', future state s. Predicted future utility

$$\hat{u}(c,s) = (1 - \alpha) u(c,s) + \alpha u(c,s')$$

ullet Structural estimation of projection bias parameter lpha

- Correlation consistent with projection bias
- Current state s', future state s. Predicted future utility

$$\hat{u}(c,s) = (1 - \alpha)u(c,s) + \alpha u(c,s')$$

ullet Structural estimation of projection bias parameter lpha

| TABLE 7 Structural Estimation | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--|--|
| | Winter Boots | Hats | Parkas & Coats | Vests | Jackets | | |
| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| α | 0.48** (0.0599) | 0.64** (0.0390) | 0.33** (0.0790) | 0.012 (0.0107) | 0.41** (0.0488) | | |

• Step 3. Non-Standard Decision-Making

1. Limited Attention: maximization set $\neq X_i$ (neglect less salient alternatives)

2. Menu Effects: Do not $\max U$


3. Persuasion and Social Pressure

4. Emotions

• Example 4. Limited Attention – Huberman and Regev (*JF* 2002)

November 28, 1997: EntreMed company (biotech) discovers cure for cancer – Articles on Science, Nature, NYT (page 23)

• May 3, 1998: NYT repeats article on page 1




• Example 5. Menu Effects – Iyengar, Huberman, and Lepper (2006)

• Data set on choice of 401(k) plans

• Comparison of plans with few options and plans with many options

• Focus on participation rate – Fractions of employees that invest



• Step 4. Market Response to Biases

- Integrate these findings into a market
 - 1. Firms (Behavioral IO)
 - 2. Employers (Behavioral Labor)
 - 3. Investors (Behavioral Finance)
 - 4. Managers (Behavioral Corporate Finance)
 - 5. Politicians (Behavioral Political Economy)
 - 6. ...

- Example 6 DellaVigna and Malmendier (*QJE*, 2004) (applied theory paper)
- Credit card customers are:
 - tempted to over-consume (self-control problems)
 - naive about self-control problems
- How should credit-card companies price cards?
- Offer no yearly fee + bonuses (cash back, airline miles)...
- ...AND charge high interest rates

TABLE II
CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY—REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTS†

| | Type of credit card offer (1) | Regular interst rate (APR) (2) | Annual fee in \$ (3) | Benefits (4) | Introductory interest rate (APR) (5) | Length of introductory offer (6) |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Citibank | Platinum Select Visa | Prime + 12.99% | 0 | | 2.90%* | 9 months |
| MBNA | Platinum Plus Visa | 12.99% | 0 | | 3.90%* | 6 months |
| First USA | Platinum Visa | Prime $+ 6.50\%$ | 0 | | 9.90%* | 9 months |
| Chase Manhattan | Wal-Mart Mastercard | Prime + 3.98% to Prime + 11.98% | 0 | | 0% | 6 months |
| Bank of America | Visa Gold | Prime + 7.99% to Prime + 12.99% | 0 | | 3.90% | 6 months |
| Household Bank | GM Mastercard | Prime + 9.99% | 0 | 5% toward GM | 2.90% | 6 months |
| Providian | Visa Platinum | Prime + 3.24% | 0 | | 0% | 3 months |
| | Visa Gold Prestige | Prime + 10.24% | 0 | | 0% | 2 months |
| | Visa Gold Preferred | Prime + 13.24% | 0 | | 0% | 2 months |
| | Visa Classic | Prime + 17.24% | 0-59-89 | | 0% | 2 months |
| Capital One | Platinum Visa | 9.90% | 0 | | N/A | N/A |
| | Gold Visa | 14.90% | 0 | | 2.90%* | 6 months |
| | Classic Visa | 19.80% | 49 | | N/A | N/A |
| Discover | Platinum Card | 13.99% | 0 | 1% Cashback | 1.70%* | 6 months |
| American Express | Blue Credit Card | 9.99% | 0 | | 0% | 6 months |
| | Optima Credit Card | Prime $+ 7.99\%$ | 0 | | 7.90% | 6 months |
| | (Gold) Charge Card | N/A | 55-75 | | N/A | N/A |

5 Psychology and Economics: Empirical Methods ods

- Psychology and Economics is
 - Idea from Psychology (Self-control, Reference Dependence, Overconfidence, Inattention, Social Preferences, Persuasion,...)
 - Setting in Economics (Asset Pricing, Charitable Giving, Consumption and Savings, Job search, ...)
- Each setting has specific methodologies -> Variety of methodologies
- Defining feature for the field is idea, not technique or methodology

However: Five main methodologies in Field P&E

1. Menu choice

- (a) Example 1. Sydnor (forthcoming) on small-scale risk aversion
- (b) Compare behavior in a menu (Ex.: deductibles)
- (c) Given a model, make inferences about preferences, beliefs, etc. (Ex.: Risk aversion)

2. Natural Experiments

- (a) Example 4. Huberman and Regev (JF, 2002) on limited attention
- (b) Treatment vs. Control comparison
- (c) Quasi-random Naturally occurring events(Ex.: timing of article publication)

3. Field experiment

- (a) Example 2. Gneezy and List (EMA, 2006) on gift exchange
- (b) Treatment vs. Control comparison
- (c) Explicit randomization in a field setting (Ex.: Additional pay)

4. Correlational studies

- (a) Example 5. Iyengar, Huberman, and Lepper (2006) on choice overload
- (b) Test correlation of two variables (Ex.: No. options and participation)
- (c) Derive conclusion Correlation, not causality here

5. Structural Identification

- (a) Example 3. Conlin, O'Donoghue and Vogelsang (AER, 2007) on projection bias
- (b) Write out model
- (c) Estimate the parameters of the model (Ex.: projection bias)

6 Methodology: Reading Psychology Journals

- One strategy for papers in Psychology and Economics:
 - Get idea from reading psychology literature
 - Think of economic setting to apply to
 - * Model new phenomenon
 - * Test with economic experiments
 - * Apply using field data
- How to start with psychology literature?

- **Step 1.** Choosing your Psychology. Not all kinds of psychology are equally useful!
 - Social Psychology (attribution errors, emotions, discrimination). YES!
 - Cognitive Psychology (Kahneman and Tversky agenda). YES!
 - Personality Psychology (Big Four personality types). Not very optimistic (Michigan and NYU group more optimistic)
 - Developmental Psychology (Development of skills in children). Not much so far, may become important (see Bill Harbaugh's experiments)
 - Comparative Psychology (Example: Asians not overconfident). Difficult to test empirically, but promising

• **Step 2.** Where to start?

- Read a good introductory book
 - * On social psychology I strongly recommend L. Ross and R.E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation, McGraw-Hill, 1991-2011.
 - * On cognitive psychology a classic is Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, Cambridge University Press, 1982
- Attend a graduate (or undergraduate) class in social of cognitive psychology. Check listing in Psychology, Sociology (Robb Willer), GSPP (Jack Glazer), and Haas (OB/Marketing)

- **Step 3.** Continuing education Choosing the psychology journals
 - Look for the top psychology journals:
 - 1. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP)
 - * Mostly very high-quality experiments
 - * Go directly to design—Do not stop at summary
 - * Skip the Section on personality psychology
 - 2. Psychological Science
 - * Recent journal, exteremely successful
 - * Publishes short articles, like Science

- 3. Psychological Bulletin
 - * Publishes mostly reviews
- 4. Psychological Review
 - * Publishes 'theoretical' contributions, i.e., attempts to summarize existing experimental evidence. No Greek letters!
- Top marketing journals can be useful too
 - 1. Journal of Consumer Research. Generally the most psychology-based
 - 2. Also Journal of Marketing Research

- **Step 4.** Reading a psychology article
 - Do not go for the newest finding.
 - * Look for findings that have been replicated, preferably by different researchers
 - * Use Google Scholar for that
 - Reading group: Reading the articles in a group of 2-3
 - Psych articles will contain typically 3-6 experiments. Focus on strongest one or two
 - Classical issues to look for:
 - * Sample sizes small

- * Are outcome variables interesting?
- * Deception
- Psych authors tend to claim that they found a new effect Look for unifying theme instead
- Read meta-analyses (summaries of experiments in an area) But be wary that many bad experiments do not make a good one

- **Step 5.** Apply it to economics
 - 1. Criticize the findings
 - Are they relevant for economics?
 - Can existing economic models explain it? (information stories often successful)
 - 2. Find economic problem could apply to
 - Brainstorm: charitable giving, yes-men in companies, shopping behavior,...
 - 3. Look for related papers in economics (and psychology)
- It may not work, but you will learn much

7 Psychology and Economics by Field

1. Public Finance

- (a) Present-bias (addiction, sin taxes, retirement savings)
- (b) Social preferences (charitable contributions)
- (c) Limited attention (incidence of taxes, low take-up of benefits)

2. Environmental Economics

- (a) Reference dependence (WTA/WTP)
- (b) Framing effects (value of a life)

3. Labor Economics

- (a) Reference dependence (labor supply, wage setting)
- (b) Social preferences (wage setting)
- (c) Money Illusion (wage setting)

4. Development Economics

- (a) Present-bias (commitment devices in savings, choice of crops)
- (b) Social preferences (group savings, trust, ethnic hatred)

- 5. Industrial organization
 - (a) Present-bias (Credit cards)
 - (b) Reference dependence (sales)
 - (c) Demand estimation + Profit maximization

- 6. Marketing
 - (a) Menu effects (Strategic pricing of products)
 - (b) Present-bias (Placement of tempting products)

- 7. Law and Economics
 - (a) Present-bias (Cooling off period)
 - (b) Emotions (litigation)

- 8. Political Economy
 - (a) Market Reaction (manipulation of hatred or inattention)
 - (b) Welfare Enhancement (SMRT plan)

- 9. Asset pricing
 - (a) Overconfidence (overtrading)
 - (b) Heterogeneity and Market Reaction (noise traders)
 - (c) Limited attention (footnotes in accounting, demographics, large events)

- 10. Corporate finance
 - (a) Overconfidence (investment, mergers, options)
 - (b) Limited attention (media)

- 11. Macro Consumption/Savings
 - (a) Present-bias (low saving + mostly illiquid wealth)
 - (b) Reference dependence (nominal wage rigidity)
 - (c) Limited attention (menu costs)

8 Defaults and 401(k)s: The Facts

- 401(k) savings most common voluntary savings vehicle in the US
 - Set aside money for retirement
 - Choice of percent contribution, and stocks/bonds composition
 - Penalty for early withdrawal
 - Sometimes: Company matching of contribution up to a threshold
- Patterns of 401(k) investment (Highly recommended survey: Choi et al.,
 2006 "Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance")

• Today: Focus on Default Effects

• Fact 1. Close to 50% of investors follows Default Plan (at least initially)

• Madrian and Shea (QJE, 2001): Single most important piece of field evidence on P&E

- Details:
 - Health Care company
 - Paper-and-pencil 401(k) choice

- Can enroll any day
- Design (Table 1)
 - Discontinuity of 401(k) plan defaults depending on date of hire
 - After 4/1/1998 investment by default
 - 50 percent match up to 6% contribution
 - Observe effect on investment decisions

| | Before 4/1/1998 | After 4/1/1998 |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Eligibility | | |
| Eligible employees | All except union and temporary employees | All except union and temporary employees |
| First eligible | After one year of employment | Immediately upon hire |
| Employer match eligible | After one year of employment | After one year of employment |
| Contributions | | |
| Employee contributions | 1 percent to 15 percent of compensation ^a | 1 percent to 15 percent of compensation ^a |
| Employer match | 50 percent of employee contribution up to 6 percent of compensation ^a | 50 percent of employee contribution up to 6 percent of compensation ^a |
| Vesting | | |
| Vesting of employee contributions | Immediate | Immediate |
| Vesting of employer contributions | 2-year cliff | 2-year cliff |
| Participation | | |
| Default participation decision | No | Yes |
| Default contribution rate | None | 3 percent of compensation |
| Default fund allocation | None | Money market fund |

- OLD Cohort hired 4/1/96-3/31/97:
 - default: no enrollment
 - 1-year wait period for eligibility

- WINDOW Cohort hired 4/1/97-3/31/98:
 - default: no enrollment
 - wait period for eligibility till 4/1/98

- NEW Cohort hired 4/1/98-3/31/99:
 - default: enrollment in 3 percent money market fund
 - immediate eligibility

| TABLE II Employee Cohorts for Comparative Analysis | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| | OLD | WINDOW | NEW | |
| Dates of hire ^a | 4/1/1996 to 3/31/1997 | 4/1/1997 to 3/31/1998 | 4/1/1998 to 3/31/1999 | |
| First eligible to participate in 401(k) plan | One year after date of hire | 4/1/1998 | Date of hire | |
| First eligible for employer match | One year after date of hire | One year after date of hire | One year after date of hire | |
| Automatically enrolled in 401(k) plan | No | No | Yes | |
| Default contribution rate | None | None | 3 percent | |
| Default fund allocation | None | None | Money market fund | |

- Step 1. Check Design (endogeneity issues)
 - Compare different cohorts: No large differences

TABLE III
COMPARISON OF WORKER CHARACTERISTICS

| | Study company | | | | |
|------------------|---------------|---|---------------|----------------|--------------------|
| | OLD cohort | $\begin{array}{c} {\rm WINDOW} \\ {\rm cohort} \end{array}$ | NEW cohort | All workers | U. S. workforce |
| Average age | | | | | |
| (years) | 37.2 | 36.0 | 34.5 | 37.6 | 38.8 |
| Gender | | | | | |
| Male | 25.4% | 23.9% | 22.0% | 22.1% | 53.1% |
| Female | 74.6 | 76.1 | 78.0 | 77.9 | 46.9 |
| $Ethnicity^a$ | | | | | |
| White | 77.1% | 71.7% | 68.8% | 75.1% | 74.6% |
| Black | 12.5 | 16.8 | 18.9 | 14.1 | 11.3 |
| Hispanic | 7.1 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 9.5 |
| Other | 3.3 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
| Hours | | | | | |
| Full-time | | | | | |
| (HPW > 35) | 96.7% | 95.6% | 95.8% | 94.6% | 78.8% |
| Part-time | | | | | |
| (HPW < 35) | 3.3 | 4.4 | 4.2 | 5.4 | 21.2 |
| $Compensation^b$ | | | | | |
| Mean | \$41,970 | \$38,424 | \$34,264 | \$40,180 | \$28,248 |
| Median | \$33,470 | \$30,530 | \$26,519 | \$31,333 | \$20,400 |

• Step 2. Compare plan choices:

1. Participation rates in 401(k) by June 30, 1999 (Figure I and Table IV):

• OLD: 57%, WINDOW: 49%, NEW: 86%





TABLE IV THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT AND IMMEDIATE ELIGIBILITY ON 401(k) Participation

| | Automatic enrollment | | Immediate eligibility | |
|---------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Participation rate of Window cohort on 6/30/98 | Participation rate of New cohort on 6/30/99 | Participation rate of Old cohort on 6/30/98 | Participation rate of Window cohort on 6/30/99 |
| Overall | 37.4% | 85.9% | 48.7% | 49.4% |
| Gender | | | | |
| Male | 42.3 | 85.7 | 56.1 | 55.9 |
| Female | 35.9 | 86.0 | 46.3 | 47.4 |
| Race / ethnicity | | | | |
| White | 42.7 | 88.2 | 53.4 | 54.4 |
| Black | 21.7 | 81.3 | 30.7 | 32.6 |
| Hispanic | 19.0 | 75.1 | 27.8 | 34.5 |
| Other | 46.2 | 85.2 | 55.0 | 62.9 |
| Age | | | | |
| Age < 20 | $\sim -10^{-1}$ | 73.6 | 25.0 | 33.3 |
| Age 20-29 | 25.3 | 82.7 | 36.7 | 36.9 |
| Age 30-39 | 37.2 | 86.3 | 47.9 | 50.3 |
| Age 40-49 | 47.3 | 90.1 | 54.9 | 58.0 |
| Age 50-59 | 51.8 | 90.0 | 64.3 | 64.3 |
| Age 60-64 | 60.0 | 86.0 | 60.6 | 70.0 |
| Compensation | | | | |
| <\$20K | 12.5 | 79.5 | 20.0 | 21.2 |
| \$20 – \$29K | 24.5 | 82.8 | 31.7 | 35.3 |
| \$30 – \$39K | 42.2 | 88.9 | 50.1 | 55.4 |
| \$40-\$49K | 51.0 | 91.8 | 61.6 | 64.5 |
| \$50 – \$59K | 61.6 | 92.8 | 70.2 | 75.2 |
| \$60 – \$69K | 59.7 | 94.7 | 79.2 | 75.1 |
| \$70-\$79K | 57.9 | 91.5 | 76.3 | 71.6 |
| 80K + | 68.3 | 94.2 | 76.3 | 82.6 |
| Sample size | N = 4249 | N = 5801 | N = 3275 | N = 4247 |


1. Contribution rates (Figures IIc):

• WINDOW: 63% are at 0 percent, 4% at 3 percent

• NEW: 65% are at 3 percent (Default)



- 1. *Allocation* of funds in stocks (Figure III):
 - OLD: 75%, WINDOW: 73%, NEW: 16%




• Results equally strong with controls (Table VI)


TABLE VI RAW AND REGRESSION-ADJUSTED EFFECTS OF AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT AND IMMEDIATE ELIGIBILITY

| | | Effect of |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | Effect of | Immediate |
| | Automatic | eligibility: Old |
| | ${ m enrollment}:$ | cohort on |
| | Window cohort on | 6/30/98 vs. |
| | 6/30/98 vs. New | Window cohort on |
| | cohort on 6/30/99 | 6/30/99 |
| 401(k) Participation rate | | |
| Raw difference | $48.5\%^{*}$ | 0.6% |
| Regression-adjusted difference | $50.4\%^{*}$ | $4.1\%^*$ |
| 401(k) Contribution rate | | |
| Raw difference | $-2.9\%^*$ | -0.1% |
| Regression-adjusted difference | $-2.2\%^*$ | 0.2% |


- Results very robust. Choi et al. (2004) Survey paper:
- Company B switches from OLD to NEW to OLD




• Company C switches from OLD to NEW to NEW2



• Company D switches from OLD to NEW to NEW2



Company H switches from OLD to NEW



- Summary.
 - OLD and NEW cohorts invest very differently one year after initial hire
 - * Fact 1. Fact 1. Close to 50% of investors follow Default Plan
 - * Fact 1a. Applies to participation (yes/no)
 - * Fact 1b. Applies also to contribution level and allocation

- (Less commonly cited) WINDOW cohort resembles OLD cohort
 - * Fact 2. 'Suggested choice' not very attractive unless default

9 Next Lecture

- More defaults effects in 401(k) savings
 - Present-biased preferences
 - Interpretation facts using present-biased preferences
- Consumption Choices
 - Investment Good. Homework
- Problem Set 1 is due next week