Appendix III
Individual-level analysis

Our user-friendly experimental interface makes it possible to present each subject with *many* choices in the course of a single experiment, yielding a rich individual-level dataset. We may therefore analyze behavior at the level of the individual subject, without the need to pool data or assume that subjects are homogenous. Furthermore, because choices are from standard budget sets, we are able to use classical revealed preference analysis to decide if subject behavior is consistent with rationality, and classical demand analysis to recover information about the underlying preferences.

As a preview, we present in Attachment I scatterplots of all choices of each subject. To facilitate presentation of the data, the figures are in color format. Each entry plots the token share $\pi_o/(\pi_s + \pi_o)$ as a function of $\log(p)$ in both treatments. The figures illustrate the striking regularity within subjects and heterogeneity across subjects that is characteristic of our data. Like FKM, we begin our individual-level analysis of the experimental data by testing for consistency with utility maximization using revealed preference axioms. We then move to estimating constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand functions for giving at the individual level. The CES form is very useful in many applications since it spans a range of well-behaved utility functions by means of a single parameter.

Testing rationality The most basic question to ask about choice data is whether it is consistent with individual utility maximization. If budget sets are linear (as in our experiment), classical revealed preference theory (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982, 1983) provides a direct test: choices in a finite collection of budget sets are consistent with maximizing a well-behaved (that is, piecewise linear, continuous, increasing, and concave) utility function if and only if they satisfy the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Hence, in order to decide whether our data are consistent with utility-maximizing behavior we only need to check whether our data satisfies GARP. Because our subjects make choices in a wide range of budget sets, our data provides a stringent test of GARP.

Although testing conformity with GARP is conceptually straightforward, there is an obvious difficulty: GARP provides an exact test of utility maximization – either the data satisfy GARP or they do not – but individual

choices frequently involve at least some violations. To account for the possibility of errors, we assess how nearly individual choice behavior complies with GARP by using Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI), which measures the fraction by which each budget constraint must be shifted in order to remove all violations of GARP. By definition, the CCEI is between 0 and 1: scores closer to 1 mean the data are closer to perfect consistency with GARP and hence to perfect consistency with utility maximization. The diagram below tabulates the average CCEI scores in our experiment:

	Treatment	
econ	I	II
Economics	0.941	0.940
Neutral	0.921	0.967
Humanist	0.952	0.951
All	0.936	0.954

We interpret these numbers as confirmation that subject choices are generally consistent with utility maximization. As another confirmation, we follow Bronars (1987), which builds on Becker (1962), and compare the behavior of our actual subjects to the behavior of simulated subjects who randomize uniformly on each budget line. Mean CCEI's for a random sample of 25,000 simulated subjects are only 0.600. Figure 1 below summarizes the distributions of CCEI scores for economics ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 1$), neutral ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 0.5$) and humanist ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 0$) subjects in both treatments, and for the random sample of hypothetical subjects. Note that if we choose the 0.9 efficiency level as our critical value, we find that a large majority of actual subjects have CCEI's above above the threshold, while only 12 of the random subjects' CCEI scores above 0.9.[1]

[Figure 1 here]

Econometric specification Our subjects' CCEI scores are sufficiently near one to justify treating the data as utility-generated, and Afriat's (1967) theorem tells us that the underlying utility function $u_s(\pi_s, \pi_o)$ that rationalizes

[1] FKM (Appendix III) provide details on testing for consistency with GARP and on alternative measures that have been suggested by Varian (1991) and Houtman and Maks (1985). In practice, all these measures yield similar conclusions.

the data can be chosen to be well-behaved. Additionally, we assume that $u_s(\pi_s, \pi_o)$ is a member of the CES family commonly employed in demand analysis. Andreoni and Miller (2002) and FKM among others successfully utilized the CES form to recover preferences for giving.

We therefore write:

$$u_s(\pi_s, \pi_o) = [\alpha(\pi_s)^\rho + (1-\alpha)(\pi_o)^\rho]^{1/\rho}$$

where α is a parameter measuring indexical selfishness (the relative weight on the payoff for $self$) and ρ is a parameter measuring attitudes towards inequality (the curvature of the altruistic indifference curves). The (constant) elasticity of altruistic substitution between $self$ and $other$ is given by $\sigma = 1/(\rho - 1)$. The CES approaches a perfect substitutes utility function as $\rho \to 1$ and the Leontief form as $\rho \to -\infty$. As $\rho \to 0$, the indifference curves approach those of log utility, which implies that the expenditures on tokens kept and given are equal to fractions α and $1-\alpha$, respectively. Further, if $\rho > 0$ ($\rho < 0$) a fall in the relative price of giving $p = p_o/p_s$ lowers (raises) the expenditure on tokens given to $other$ $p_o\pi_o$. Thus, any $\rho > 0$ indicates distributional preferences weighted towards increasing total payoffs, whereas any $\rho < 0$ indicates distributional preferences weighted towards reducing differences in payoffs.

The CES demand function is given by

$$p_s\pi_s = \frac{g}{p^r + g}$$

where

$$r = -\rho/(\rho - 1)$$

and

$$g = [\alpha/(1-\alpha)]^{1/(1-\rho)}.$$

This generates the following individual-level econometric specification for each subject i:

$$p^t_{s,i}\pi^t_{s,i} = \frac{g_i}{(p^t_i)^{r_i} + g_i} + \epsilon^t_i$$

where $t = 1, ..., 50$ and ϵ^t_n is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ^2_i. Note that the demands are estimated as expenditure shares (or budget shares), which are bounded between zero and one, with an $i.i.d.$ error term. We generate estimates of $\hat{g}_i$ and $\hat{r}_i$ using non-linear Tobit

maximum likelihood, and use this to infer the values of the underlying CES parameters $\hat{\alpha}_i$ and $\hat{\rho}_i$ and the (constant) elasticity of altruistic substitution $\hat{\sigma}_i$.[2] We emphasize again that our estimations are done for each subject i separately, generating separate estimates $\hat{g}_i$ and $\hat{r}_i$.

Estimation results Before proceeding to the estimations, we omit the subjects with CCEI scores below 0.80 as their choices are not sufficiently consistent to be considered utility-generated. We also screen subjects with readily identifiable preferences for whom the CES function is not well defined. These include the 22 subjects with uniformly selfish allocations, as well as one pure Rawlsian subject. Attachment II below presents, subject by subject, the results of the estimations. An additional column lists the CCEI scores. Table 1 below displays summary statistics and percentile values. We present the statistics for all subjects, as well as the statistics of economics ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 1$), neutral ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 0.5$) and humanist ($\boldsymbol{econ} = 0$) subjects. An interesting feature of the estimates from both treatments is the considerable heterogeneity in both parameters $\hat{\alpha}_i$ and $\hat{\rho}_i$. Nevertheless, like FKM, our results lean overall toward a social welfare conception of distributional preferences.

[Table 1 here]

Table 1A presents the estimates of $\hat{\rho}_i$ for each treatment. Tables 1B and 1C present the estimates of $\hat{\alpha}_i$. In Table 1C we include the perfectly selfish subjects by letting their α-value equal one, the parameter value which corresponds to pure selfishness in the CES model (their ρ-value cannot be identified). In order to highlight the differences across economics, neutral and humanist subject, we test the hypothesis that each pair of estimated parameters are from populations with the same distribution using the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test. The two bottom rows of each panel of Table 1 tabulate the results. The entries have the form $a \mid b \mid c$ reporting the results after grouping neutral and humanist subjects, economics and neutral subjects, and economics and humanist subjects, respectively. The bottom rows report an estimate of the probability that the parameter value for the first group is larger than the parameter value for the second group.

There is one important difference between the estimations presented in the paper based on Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) and those that come out of the CES

[2] We generate virtually identical parameter values using non-linear least squares.

model. In terms of the measured impact of economics exposure on efficiency-equity tradeoffs (ρ), the CES formulation generates very similar results to our reduced form model (even somewhat larger in magnitude). However, for the measure of indexical selfishness (α), the CES estimates imply no effect of economics exposure. To understand why the two models generate different results along this dimension, we visually inspected the data for subjects where the α estimates differed substantially from the average value of $p_s\pi_s$. We found that the CES model provided a poor fit for these subjects, whose allocations were generally characterized as 'usually' selfish, but with a small number of outlying non-selfish allocations. Owing to the sharp non-linearities in the CES demand function, these became very influential outliers in the CES specifications. By contrast, the linear Tobit we employ in this paper provides a very good fit. Further, since the main purpose of the estimation is to give a population-level summary of the rich individual-level data, we favor the reduced form approach, which provides a good fit and offers flexibility, tractability and straightforward interpretation.

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Table 1. Summery statistics

1A. p-values (non-selfish subjects)

		Treatment I				Treatment II			
		econ			All	***econ***			All
		0	0.5	1		0	0.5	1	
	Mean	-0.573	-0.014	0.159	-0.134	0.080	0.327	0.549	0.320
	SD	1.267	0.836	1.595	1.209	0.600	0.909	0.585	0.762
Percentiles	5	-3.153	-1.978	-4.348	-3.153	-1.285	-2.876	-1.029	-1.285
	25	-1.347	-0.679	0.436	0.405	-0.145	0.431	0.515	0.546
	50	-0.227	0.382	0.662	0.657	0.066	0.635	0.642	0.748
	75	0.544	0.587	0.799	0.825	0.530	0.748	0.951	0.975
	95	0.825	0.807	0.944	-0.533	0.787	0.962	0.980	0.140
	z	1.135	1.897	2.042		1.822	0.767	2.117	
	prob.	0.631	0.725	0.764		0.711	0.589	0.780	

1B. α-values (non-selfish subjects)

		Treatment I				Treatment II			
		econ			All	***econ***			All
		0	0.5	1		0	0.5	1	
	Mean	0.704	0.744	0.679	0.715	0.682	0.724	0.667	0.698
	SD	0.181	0.168	0.100	0.155	0.193	0.146	0.097	0.148
Percentiles	5	0.494	0.483	0.514	0.494	0.490	0.512	0.516	0.507
	25	0.526	0.581	0.597	0.591	0.507	0.568	0.623	0.549
	50	0.706	0.746	0.679	0.706	0.588	0.769	0.665	0.695
	75	0.897	0.861	0.740	0.845	0.889	0.840	0.733	0.824
	95	1.000	1.000	0.865	1.000	0.974	0.948	0.824	0.948
	z	0.444	-1.001	0.000		0.527	-1.247	0.378	
	prob.	0.551	0.381	0.500		0.561	0.356	0.550	

1C. α-values (full sample)

		Treatment I				Treatment II			
		econ			All	***econ***			All
		0	0.5	1		0	0.5	1	
	Mean	0.809	0.822	0.831	0.821	0.788	0.802	0.815	0.802
	SD	0.204	0.184	0.179	0.185	0.219	0.176	0.184	0.187
Percentiles	5	0.494	0.530	0.514	0.667	0.490	0.524	0.516	0.507
	25	0.596	0.698	0.667	0.508	0.549	0.673	0.647	0.623
	50	0.897	0.845	0.865	0.865	0.889	0.832	0.795	0.828
	75	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	95	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	z	-0.014	0.468	0.641		0.028	0.277	0.746	
	prob.	0.499	0.541	0.560		0.503	0.524	0.574	

Figure 1A. The distributions of CCEI scores
Treatment I



Figure 1B. The distributions of CCEI scores
Treatment II



Attachment 1. The relationship between log price-ratio and token share -- Treatment I (Blue) and Treatment II (Red)




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Log price ratio


ID 33
ID 34
ID 35
ID 36
Token share
Log price ratio
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1


ID 37
Token share
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-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 38
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 39
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 40
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 41
ID 42
ID 43
ID 44
Token share
Log price ratio
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
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1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1


ID 45
ID 46
ID 47
ID 48
Token share
Log price ratio
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1


ID 49
ID 50
ID 51
ID 52
Token share
Log price ratio
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
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1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1


ID 53
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 54
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 55
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 56
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 57
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 58
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 59
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 60
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 61
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 62
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 63
Token share
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-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 64
Token share
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Log price ratio


ID 65
Token share
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Log price ratio


ID 66
Token share
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
-1
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Log price ratio

Attachment II. CES estimation results

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
1	0	1		1.000	0.348	0.479	-1.534	0.880	0.143	-0.534	0.219
		2		0.677							
2	0.5	1		0.993	0.432	0.703	-1.762	4.559	1.017	-0.762	0.319
		2		0.947	0.771	0.863	-4.361	3.1E+03	9.2E+14	-3.361	5.319
3	0.5	1		0.998	0.405	0.591	-1.680	1.855	0.304	-0.680	0.288
		2		0.904	0.541	0.524	-2.178	1.233	0.122	-1.178	0.247
4	0	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
5	0	1		0.678							
		2		0.965	-1.215	0.619	-0.451	1.244	0.060	0.549	0.074
6	0	1		0.998	0.698	0.508	-3.311	1.106	0.078	-2.311	0.233
		2		1.000	0.684	0.507	-3.163	1.097	0.045	-2.163	0.137
7	0.5	1		0.962	-1.341	1.000	-0.427	34.833	6.4E+09	0.573	3.239
		2		0.956	0.377	0.904	-1.605	36.670	26.848	-0.605	0.592
8	1	1		1.000	0.086	0.903	-1.094	11.429	3.5E+13	-0.094	3.189
		2	1	0.582							
9	0	1		0.995	-2.299	1.000	-0.303	23.516	2.911	0.697	0.223
		2		0.978	-0.145	0.974	-0.873	23.872	2.884	0.127	0.139
10	0.5	1		1.000	-0.533	0.999	-0.652	97.447	122.583	0.348	0.637
		2		0.985	0.746	0.859	-3.932	1.2E+03	7.8E+15	-2.932	2.869
11	0.5	1		0.808	0.657	0.572	-2.918	2.330	0.469	-1.918	0.469
		2		0.974	0.738	0.568	-3.812	2.853	0.662	-2.812	0.978
12	0	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							

Prototypical preferences: 1-selfish, 2-Rawlsian,3-utalitarian, 4-logaritmic

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
13	0	1		0.977	-0.064	0.563	-0.940	1.268	0.146	0.060	0.206
		2		0.928	0.140	0.549	-1.163	1.257	0.064	-0.163	0.160
14	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	0.977							
15	0.5	1		1.000	0.768	0.745	-4.319	102.530	1.1E+13	-3.319	2.515
		2		0.966	0.815	0.748	-5.410	355.065	2.4E+10	-4.410	3.472
16	0.5	1		0.721							
		2		0.583							
17	0	1	2	1.000							
		2	2	1.000							
18	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
19	1	1		1.000	0.571	0.514	-2.331	1.141	0.183	-1.331	0.444
		2		0.983	0.514	0.516	-2.057	1.138	0.084	-1.057	0.208
20	1	1		0.970	0.799	0.667	-4.972	31.956	3.7E+24	-3.972	15.429
		2		0.978	0.669	0.623	-3.025	4.588	1.134	-2.025	0.467
21	0.5	1		1.000	0.549	0.530	-2.215	1.309	0.136	-1.215	0.138
		2		0.929	0.497	0.537	-1.987	1.345	0.106	-0.987	0.099
22	0.5	1		0.954	-1.978	0.747	-0.336	1.438	0.049	0.664	0.054
		2		0.810	-0.610	0.800	-0.621	2.365	0.182	0.379	0.089
23	1	1		0.874	0.991	0.592	-1.2E+02	4.2E+18	4.9E+22	-1.1E+02	52.676
		2		0.629							
24	0.5	1		0.995	-0.014	0.549	-0.986	1.214	0.137	0.014	0.235
		2		0.998	0.431	0.544	-1.759	1.366	0.050	-0.759	0.060

Prototypical preferences: 1-selfish, 2-Rawlsian,3-utalitarian, 4-logaritmic

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
25	0.5	1		0.922	-0.825	0.798	-0.548	2.120	0.201	0.452	0.180
		2		0.881	-2.876	0.722	-0.258	1.280	0.112	0.742	0.138
26	1	1		1.000	0.944	0.736	-17.811	8.5E+07	9.1E+23	-16.811	10.448
		2		0.993	0.980	0.633	-49.560	5.2E+11	4.4E+25	-48.560	21.051
27	0	1		0.774							
		2		0.885	-1.066	0.619	-0.484	1.265	0.071	0.516	0.082
28	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
29	0.5	1		0.978	0.360	0.845	-1.561	14.097	3.8E+06	-0.561	0.979
		2		0.853	0.962	0.791	-26.286	1.7E+15	2.8E+18	-25.286	10.660
30	0	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	0.999							
31	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	0.952							
32	1	1	1	0.620							
		2	1	1.000							
33	0.5	1		0.993	0.236	0.876	-1.308	12.954	1.192	-0.308	0.144
		2		0.993	0.516	0.840	-2.065	30.869	4.755	-1.065	0.116
34	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
35	1	1		0.983	-4.348	0.865	-0.187	1.416	0.062	0.813	0.111
		2		0.878	-1.029	0.535	-0.493	1.071	0.023	0.507	0.061
36	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							

Prototypical preferences: 1-selfish, 2-Rawlsian,3-utalitarian, 4-logaritmic

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
37	0	1		1.000	0.825	0.494	-5.730	0.862	0.041	-4.730	0.402
		2		1.000	0.787	0.490	-4.686	0.822	0.061	-3.686	0.331
38	0.5	1		1.000	0.979	0.751	-46.958	3.5E+22	3.7E+25	-45.958	13.388
		2		0.794							
39	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
40	1	1		1.000	0.813	0.740	-5.358	270.825	5.7E+02	-4.358	1.473
		2		1.000	0.951	0.766	-20.319	2.8E+10	1.4E+17	-19.319	10.281
41	0	1		0.976	-1.017	0.845	-0.496	2.321	0.133	0.504	0.070
		2		0.981	-1.285	0.923	-0.438	2.960	0.144	0.562	0.053
42	1	1		0.787							
		2		0.819	-0.081	0.932	-0.925	11.293	5.1E+13	0.075	3.062
43	0	1	1	0.775							
		2		1.000	0.619	0.647	-2.628	4.905	1.771	-1.628	0.623
44	0	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
45	0.5	1		1.000	0.807	0.798	-5.185	1.2E+03	4.9E+14	-4.185	8.071
		2		0.903	0.748	0.832	-3.976	578.634	1.6E+12	-2.976	2.537
46	1	1	1	0.552							
		2	1	1.000							
47	1	1		0.988	0.778	0.749	-4.506	136.401	4.6E+10	-3.506	1.827
		2		1.000	0.750	0.706	-4.000	33.312	1.4E+02	-3.000	0.823
48	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							

Prototypical preferences: 1-selfish, 2-Rawlsian,3-utalitarian, 4-logaritmic

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
49	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
50	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
51	0.5	1		0.998	0.693	0.588	-3.253	3.201	1.073	-2.253	1.214
		2		0.716							
52	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
53	0	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	0.893							
54	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
55	0.5	1		0.996	0.460	0.483	-1.852	0.879	0.088	-0.852	0.214
		2		0.864	0.677	0.512	-3.096	1.159	0.077	-2.096	0.213
56	0.5	1		0.819	-0.830	0.968	-0.546	6.471	0.880	0.454	0.137
		2		0.901	-0.587	0.948	-0.630	6.202	1.014	0.370	0.169
57	0	1		0.938	0.024	0.717	-1.024	2.593	0.266	-0.024	0.174
		2		0.964	-0.008	0.806	-0.992	4.100	0.378	0.008	0.089
58	0.5	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
59	0	1		0.998	-0.292	0.897	-0.774	5.333	0.713	0.226	0.187
		2		0.909	-0.058	0.889	-0.946	7.180	0.364	0.054	0.082
60	1	1		0.987	0.439	0.597	-1.783	2.016	0.228	-0.783	0.177
		2		0.976	0.615	0.647	-2.596	4.826	1.074	-1.596	0.305

ID	***econ***	Treatment	Prototypical preferences	CCEI	p	α	σ	g	SE(g)	r	SE(r)
61	0	1		0.987	-1.347	0.526	-0.426	1.044	0.042	0.574	0.099
		2		0.950	-0.261	0.589	-0.793	1.329	0.081	0.207	0.125
62	1	1		0.989	0.403	0.593	-1.676	1.880	0.103	-0.676	0.071
		2		1.000	0.515	0.684	-2.060	4.896	0.693	-1.060	0.173
63	0	1		0.978	0.544	0.596	-2.195	2.339	0.245	-1.195	0.241
		2		0.953	0.418	0.588	-1.717	1.841	0.122	-0.717	0.155
64	1	1		0.984	0.752	0.691	-4.034	25.768	2.3E+24	-3.034	27.469
		2		0.977	0.551	0.824	-2.229	31.081	27.123	-1.229	0.280
65	1	1	1	1.000							
		2	1	1.000							
66	0.5	1		0.992	0.624	0.698	-2.663	9.343	1.813	-1.663	0.253
		2		1.000	0.724	0.673	-3.623	13.623	4.476	-2.623	0.373

Prototypical preferences: 1-selfish, 2-Rawlsian,3-utalitarian, 4-logaritmic