

Ec 234A, Macroeconomic Finance: Lecture 9

March 15, 2011

Outline for today

1. Limited participation/diversification
2. Incomplete markets and labor income risk
3. Habit formation

1. Limited participation

- Euler equation only holds for participants


$$EP = \gamma \text{cov} \left(r_{t+1}, \Delta c^{\text{PART}} \right)$$

- Empirically, $\sigma(\Delta c^{\text{AGGR}}) \approx 1\%$, but Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find $\sigma(\Delta c^{\text{PART}}) \approx 3\%$.
 - Puzzle persists even with s. d. of 3%.
- Evidence that participants behave differently:
 1. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) different EIS for stockholders vs non-stockholders.
 2. Ait-Sahalia, Parker and Yogo (2004) luxury goods consumed by rich.

Limited diversification

- Evidence:
 1. Home/regional bias in portfolios: French- Poterba (1991), Coval-Moskowitz
 2. Default effects, Choi et al (2004)
 3. Holding stocks of the company you work for.
 4. “Naive diversification” Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Huberman and Jiang (2004)
- Asset pricing vs welfare consequences
 - Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007): investments in Sweden.

b. Complete Portfolios



2. Incomplete markets and heterogenous risk

- Constantinides-Duffie (1996): labor income risk can affect asset prices.
- Assume that $C_{k,t}$ lognormally distributed in cross-section, and

$$\text{cov}^* \left(\Delta c_{k,t+1}, c_{k,t} \right) = 0.$$

– Cross-sectional distribution of cons does not have a steady state.

- IMRS $M_{k,t+1} = \delta \left(C_{k,t+1}/C_{k,t} \right)^{-\gamma}$ of each investor k is a valid SDF

$$1 = \mathbf{E}_t \left[(1 + R_{i,t+1}) M_{k,t+1} \right].$$

- Denoting population average by \mathbf{E}^* , let M^* be average SDF:

$$M_{t+1}^* = \mathbf{E}^* M_{k,t+1} = (1/K) \sum M_{k,t+1}.$$

- By lognormality in the cross-section,

$$M_{t+1}^* = \mathbf{E}^* \delta \left(\frac{C_{k,t+1}}{C_{k,t}} \right)^{-\gamma}$$

can be calculated as expectation of lognormal:

$$m_{t+1}^* = \log \delta - \gamma \mathbf{E}^* \Delta c_{k,t+1} + \frac{\gamma^2}{2} \text{var}^* (\Delta c_{k,t+1}).$$

- Econometrician trying to estimate model w/ aggregate cons:

$$M_{t+1}^{\text{RA}} = \delta \left(\frac{\mathbf{E}^* C_{k,t+1}}{\mathbf{E}^* C_{k,t}} \right)^{-\gamma}.$$

- To calculate this, first note

$$\log \mathbf{E}^* C_{k,t+1} = \mathbf{E}^* c_{k,t+1} + (1/2) \text{var}^* (c_{k,t+1}).$$

- Hence, using $\text{cov}^* (\Delta c_{k,t+1}, c_{k,t}) = 0$

$$\begin{aligned} m_{t+1}^{\text{RA}} &= \log \delta - \gamma \mathbf{E}^* \Delta c_{k,t+1} - \frac{\gamma}{2} [\text{var}^* (c_{k,t+1}) - \text{var}^* (c_{k,t})] \\ &= \log \delta - \gamma \mathbf{E}^* \Delta c_{k,t+1} - \frac{\gamma}{2} \text{var}^* (\Delta c_{k,t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

- Now compare m_{t+1}^* and m_{t+1}^{RA}

$$m_{t+1}^* - m_{t+1}^{\text{RA}} = \frac{\gamma(\gamma + 1)}{2} \text{var}^* (\Delta c_{k,t+1}).$$

- Basic point: because $x^{-\gamma}$ is a convex function, we have

$$\mathbf{E}^* (C_{k,t+1}/C_{k,t})^{-\gamma} > (\mathbf{E}^* C_{k,t+1}/\mathbf{E}^* C_{k,t})^{-\gamma}$$

- To get mispricing in excess returns, need $\text{cov}(\text{var}^* (\Delta c_{k,t+1}), R) \neq 0$.

3. Habit formation

- Repetition of stimulus diminishes perception of stimulus and responses to it. Difference model of habit preferences:

$$\max E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \delta^j \frac{(C_{t+j} - X_{t+j})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}.$$

habit is X_t , and utility increases in *surplus consumption* $C_t - X_t$.

- X_t depends on past consumption:

$$X_t = f(C_t, C_{t-1}, \dots, C_{t-T}).$$

- Internal vs external habit: C is agent's own past cons or aggregate cons
- With representative agent: impose habit rule before or after FOC.

Implications of habit models

1. Sluggish consumption adjustment.

- X_t responds slowly to shocks because it depends on past consumption levels.

2. Magnified risk aversion.

- Define the surplus consumption ratio $S_t = (C_t - X_t) / C_t$, then curvature of period utility

$$\frac{-C u_{CC}}{u_C} = \gamma \frac{C_t}{C_t - X_t} = \frac{\gamma}{S}.$$

- To compute risk aversion, we need to calculate the curvature of $V(W)$.

3. Time-variation in risk aversion.

Long term risk

- Assume cons/wealth ratio is stationary.
 - Over long horizons, volatility of cons and wealth must be equal.
- In short term, stocks are more volatile. If stocks proxy for wealth then either
 1. Consumption risk should rise with horizon; or
 2. Wealth risk should fall with horizon.
- Indirect evidence:
 1. Real US consumption growth is not well forecast by its own history.
 2. Stock returns are predictable.

The volatility puzzle

- If the world is safe, why are stock prices so volatile?
- Recall the decomposition

$$p_t - d_t = \text{const.} + \mathbf{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j (\Delta d_{t+j+1} - r_{t+j+1}).$$

- Evidence suggests volatility comes from time-variation in returns.
- Source of time-variation in returns?

excess return = quantity of risk \times price of risk